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BALANCING COMPASSION AND RISK IN CLIMATE 
ADAPTATION: U.S. WATER, DROUGHT, AND 
AGRICULTURAL LAW 
Robert W. Adler* 
Abstract 
It is inevitable that the world will experience a significant amount of 
global warming before efforts to mitigate the buildup of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere can even begin to succeed. Therefore, 
adaptation to climate change impacts, as well as mitigation, will be 
necessary to deal with climate disruption. In designing climate change 
adaptation efforts, a looming issue is how to balance the need and 
compassionate impulse to provide financial and other relief to victims 
of climate disruption impacts with the equally compelling need to 
reduce the overall risk of those impacts. U.S. water, drought, and 
agricultural law and policy provide a good example of how past disaster 
relief efforts have sought to compensate drought victims or to insulate 
them against the effects of drought, but in the process have encouraged 
behavior that increases long-term risk and vulnerability. For example, 
past and ongoing water and agricultural law and policy encourage 
production of crops with high water demand and with inefficient 
irrigation methods, even in arid regions, and fail to provide significant 
incentives for sustainable water use.  
In the long run, a more “compassionate” approach, particularly as a 
strategy for climate change adaptation, is to implement systemic 
policies to reduce vulnerability to drought and other climate-induced 
disasters by increasing the sustainability of various economic sectors in 
advance. For example, drought should be defined such that 
governmental relief is available only for impacts that are beyond the 
range of reasonable predictability; and drought relief should be 
conditioned on actions to use water more sustainably, and thereby to 
reduce drought vulnerability. Similarly, agricultural policy should 
provide incentives to shift production, particularly of water-intensive 
crops, to regions with increasing, rather than decreasing, water supply. 
These efforts to balance compassion and risk will become increasingly 
important as drought and other impacts of climate disruption become 
more frequent and more severe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The prevailing consensus among climate scientists is that the world 
is now “committed” to a significant amount of global warming before 
efforts to reverse the buildup of greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the 
atmosphere can even begin to succeed.1 The magnitude, timing, and 
distribution of expected warming remains uncertain and depends on 
future political decisions about climate change mitigation, as well as the 
inherent uncertainty in our ability to predict future climatic conditions, 
given available modeling and assessment methods. Current model 
projections, however, suggest that even the lowest projected levels of 
warming will generate significant disruption in a wide range of physical 
conditions around the globe and that the highest levels of warming 
could cause human and environmental impacts of catastrophic 
proportions, at least in many regions.2 
Given these realities, it is increasingly clear that adaptation, as well 
as mitigation, will be necessary to deal with climate disruption.3 In the 
case of adaptation, a looming issue is how to balance the likely need 
and compassionate impulse to provide financial and other relief to 
victims of climate disruption impacts with the equally compelling need 
to reduce the overall risk of those impacts. Those two goals, however, 
are not always compatible or consistent. 
Even absent climate change, disaster relief is often controversial if it 
encourages behavior that increases long-term risk. For example, 
compensating property owners in flood- or storm-prone regions may 
encourage construction in those areas, thus increasing societal risk.4 
                                                                                                                     
 1. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, ADAPTING TO THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 17 (2010) 
(noting that impacts of climate change are already being felt in the United States and that future 
impacts are unavoidable); see also V. Ramanathan & Y. Feng, On Avoiding Dangerous 
Anthropogenic Interference with the Climate System: Formidable Challenges Ahead, 105 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 14,245–46 (2008) (estimating committed warming of 2.4°C even if 
greenhouse gas concentrations are held to 2005 levels); Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible 
Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1709 
(2009).  
 2. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM 
2009, at 8 (Catherine P. McMullen & Jason Jabbour eds., 2009) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 
SCIENCE COMPENDIUM] (identifying inevitable commitment to ocean acidification, sea level rise, 
glacier loss, changes in the hydrological cycle, ecosystem destruction, and species extinction 
given current levels of change, and more severe effects absent effective and timely mitigation). 
 3. See generally Holly Doremus & Michael Hanemann, The Challenges of Dymanic 
Water Management in the American West, 26 UCLA J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 55, 56 (2008); J.B. 
Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental Law, 40 
ENVTL. L. 363 (2010); A. Dan Tarlock, Now Think Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 169 (1992); Matthew F. Zinn, Adapating to Climate Change: Environmental Law in a 
Warmer World, 34 ECOL. L.Q. 61 (2007).  
 4. See James M. Wright & Don L. Porter, Floodplain Management and Natural Systems, 
in WATER RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: POLICY, PRACTICE AND 
3
Adler: Balancing Compassion And Risk In Climate Adaptation: U.S. Water,
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
204 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
Likewise, subsidized drought relief programs might encourage farmers 
to engage in riskier agricultural practices—such as growing water-
intensive crops in arid regions or using inefficient irrigation methods—
because the promise of public relief and subsidized water reduces or 
eliminates incentives for farmers to internalize those risks in their 
business decisions. As a result, drought relief policy might impede more 
sustainable agricultural practices and policies, including policies 
designed to match agricultural practices to local environmental 
conditions. That perverse feedback can render the community even 
more vulnerable to future drought. 
This balance between compassion, risk allocation, and risk reduction 
in disaster relief policy will become even more important if adverse 
effects of climate disruption materialize as predicted.5 The 
compassionate response will be to compensate victims for changes in 
local conditions caused by global economic forces that are beyond their 
control. If relief allows those victims to continue practices that render 
them vulnerable, however, those policies will increase long-term risks. 
Moreover, vulnerability increases with the frequency of the event, 
decreasing the recovery interval between disasters.6 The result will 
likely be a vicious cycle of relief and increased risk. Given the 
likelihood of this scenario, perhaps a more “compassionate” approach is 
to implement systemic policies to reduce vulnerability to climate-
induced disasters by increasing the sustainability of various economic 
sectors in advance. 
Although the same analysis could be performed for other changes 
expected due to climate disruption (such as sea level rise or increased 
flooding), drought and agricultural policy provides one good model for 
analysis of this concept. First, increased incidence and severity of 
drought are among the most serious expected climate change impacts.7 
                                                                                                                     
EMERGING ISSUES 142, 143 (Martin Reuss ed., 1993) (noting that new floodplain development 
continued after adoption of National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)). The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) recently solicited public input on reforms to address ongoing 
concerns with the NFIP. See Federal Emergency Management Agency: Public Meetings of 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Reform Effort, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,096, 69,096 (Nov. 
10, 2010). 
 5. Although it is difficult to trace any given flood, drought, or other hydrological 
phenomenon to global average changes in climate, some scientists suggest that climate 
catastrophes are already increasing due to climate disruption. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Scientists 
Perplexed by Weird Weather Patterns, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2011), 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2014020916_weather24.html. 
 6. See infra Section I.B. 
 7. See, e.g., LUIS SANTOS PEREIRA ET AL., COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY: ADDRESSING 
THE CHALLENGES 26–27 (2009); Syukuro Manabe et al., Simulated Long-Term Changes in River 
Discharge and Soil Moisture Due to Global Warming, 49 HYDROLOGICAL SCI. 625, 626 (2004); 
Guiling Wang, Agricultural Drought in a Future Climate: Results from Fifteen Global Climate 
Models Participating in the IPCC Fourth Assessment, 25 CLIMATE DYNAMICS 739, 739–40 
4
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Second, past drought relief policies have faced similar tensions in 
balancing compassion and risk. As is true with respect to many kinds of 
disasters, the modern governmental response to drought has been driven 
by the desire to compensate victims for harm caused by unpredictable 
changes in natural conditions through financial aid, free or subsidized 
water, or relief from regulations or other legal requirements. Although 
drought relief is the product of a range of political, economic, and other 
factors,8 compassion is arguably one dominant motivating force. We do 
not like to see people and their livelihoods suffer, especially for factors 
that are beyond their control and for events that are relatively rare and 
unpredictable. Moreover, when farmers—arguably the most frequent 
victims of drought—bear the economic risk of uncertainty to produce 
essential products, it seems equitable to distribute those risks across 
society. 
Another legitimate goal of drought policy, however, is long-term 
risk reduction. For example, policies could be designed to promote 
drought-resistant crops or crop varieties, encourage more efficient 
irrigation methods, and encourage farmers to relocate from areas 
expected to face increasing aridity to those likely to experience more 
favorable conditions. Rather than devoting scarce financial and other 
resources to reactive policies that are likely to increase long-term risks, 
a sustainability-based approach to disaster prevention will reduce long-
term vulnerability and potentially enhance the welfare of the 
beneficiaries and society as a whole. 
A disaster prevention strategy designed to reduce vulnerability to 
drought may require changes to deep-rooted economic policies in the 
agricultural and other sectors of the economy. At the most basic level, it 
will require us to rethink what constitutes a “disaster,” as opposed to the 
normal range of variability in weather and other conditions within 
particular regions. This requires an initial inquiry into what is meant by 
the term “drought.” Second, a prevention-oriented strategy requires us 
to identify factors that tend to increase drought vulnerability and to 
evaluate potential ways to reduce that vulnerability. Third, it will 
require us to revise our philosophy regarding the range of conditions 
that warrant subsidized public drought relief to protect farming and 
other water-intensive activities, especially in areas that may no longer 
be hospitable to those pursuits. In the United States, however, that shift 
will also require us to reevaluate some of the core components of 
national agricultural policy dating back to the New Deal. Thus, to 
understand the effect of current laws and policies that have the greatest 
impact on drought in the United States, we also need to explore the 
                                                                                                                     
(2005).  
 8. See infra Part I. 
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history of, and rationale for, both drought law and policy and relevant 
aspects of U.S. agricultural law and policy. 
Part I of this Article provides the analytical framework for a 
prevention-based or sustainability-based approach to drought mitigation 
in a changing climate. First, it explores the nature and definition of 
drought and examines how the conceptualization of drought affects 
drought law and policy. Second, it evaluates conditions that increase 
human vulnerability to drought and what might be done to reduce that 
vulnerability. Part II critiques the history of U.S. water and drought law 
and policy and related aspects of federal agricultural law and policy and 
evaluates changes in U.S.9 law and policy that would promote more 
sustainable water use and thereby reduce society’s vulnerability to 
drought. Finally, this Article concludes with some preliminary 
comments on the broader lessons that the preceding analysis might 
suggest for adaptation strategies to address other impacts of climate 
change. 
I.  AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: FACTORS AFFECTING DROUGHT RISK 
AND IMPACTS 
Public policy toward drought response is shaped by perceptions 
about the nature and frequency of drought and its impacts on various 
economic sectors. Risk allocation decisions regarding drought have 
significant implications for public and private investment. Those 
decisions are based on a range of considerations, including the 
perceived rarity and predictability of drought, the nature and value of 
activities to be protected, and the fairness of concentrating drought risk 
among a few individuals and businesses rather than distributing risks 
across society. However, drought policy is also influenced by the nature 
and location of activities affected by drought, and the vulnerability of 
those activities to scarce water supplies and other conditions associated 
with drought, such as heat spells and high winds. A more detailed 
analysis of competing drought laws and policies, therefore, should 
consider both the nature and definition of drought and factors that affect 
drought vulnerability. 
A.  Impacts and Perceptions of Drought 
Drought has plagued civilizations throughout history.10 Extreme 
drought can cause severe economic and social dislocation, as in the 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Although this Article focuses on U.S. law, the analysis also suggests lessons for other 
parts of the world. 
 10. See WAYNE C. PALMER, Foreword to U.S. WEATHER BUR. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 45: 
METEOROLOGICAL DROUGHT, at ii (1965) (“Drought has been cited as a scourge of mankind 
since biblical times.”). 
6
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Dust Bowl in the United States during the Great Depression,11 or 
societal collapse,12 as some historians believe happened to the Sumerian 
and Mayan civilizations.13 While not as immediate as hurricanes, 
tornadoes, floods, or other hazards, drought often causes as much or 
more human suffering and loss of life.14 Between 1900 and 2005, at 
least ten million people died and two billion people were adversely 
affected by drought and related famines; indeed, those statistics likely 
underestimate human impacts.15 And as with other natural disasters, the 
most severe burdens of drought (famine, malnutrition, disease, loss of 
livelihood, and economic dislocation) often fall on those least able to 
cope with them (the poor, women, children, and the elderly), due to 
inadequate financial or material reserves or lack of other sources of food 
or income.16 
Climate disruption is likely to exacerbate drought impacts. 
Climatologists predict significant shifts in global precipitation, with 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See generally JOHN C. HOYT, DROUGHT OF 1936, WITH DISCUSSION ON THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF DROUGHT IN RELATION TO CLIMATE (1938) (discussing the major droughts 
experienced by almost all of the states during the 1930–1934 period); VANCE JOHNSON, 
HEAVEN’S TABLELAND, THE DUST BOWL STORY (1974); GREAT PLAINS COMMITTEE, THE FUTURE 
OF THE GREAT PLAINS (1936) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS] (discussing the 
migrations from the Great Plains Region resulting from the droughts of the 1930s); John Opie, 
Moral Geography in High Plains History, 88 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 241, 250–51 (1998) 
(describing the economic and socioeconomic effects of the Dust Bowl). 
 12. See THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES: HISTORY, DEVELOPMENT, 
MANAGEMENT, AND POLICY 1 (2d ed. 2005) (“[P]oor water management brought a decline in the 
health and well-being of citizens and, in extreme cases, even death to an entire civilization.”). 
 13. See EUGENE LINDEN, THE WINDS OF CHANGE: CLIMATE, WEATHER, AND THE 
DESTRUCTION OF CIVILIZATIONS 49–53, 69–73 (2006) (discussing the effects of drought on both 
the Akkadian and Mayan civilizations); David Getches, Water Wrongs: Why Can’t We Get It 
Right the First Time?, 34 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2004) (noting that the fall of the Sumerian civilization 
followed “environmental degradation from intensive irrigation”); G.H. Haug et al., Climate and 
the Collapse of the Maya Civilization, 299 SCIENCE 1731, 1731–35 (2003). But see LINDEN, 
supra, at 69, 151 (noting scientific disagreement on the causes of civilization collapse); M.J. 
Ingram, G. Farmer & T.M.L. Wigley, Past Climates and Their Impact on Man: A Review, in 
CLIMATE AND HISTORY: STUDIES IN PAST CLIMATES AND THEIR IMPACT ON MAN 3, 18–22 
(T.M.L. Wigley et al. eds., 1981) (discussing factors favoring and disfavoring “climate 
determinism” in human history). 
 14. See Heather Cooley, Floods and Droughts, in THE WORLD’S WATER 2006–2007: THE 
BIENNIAL REPORT ON FRESHWATER RESOURCES 91, 95–96 (Peter H. Gleick ed., 2006). 
 15. See id. at 96–97 & n.4. These figures are probably significant underestimates due to 
inadequate data and reporting, especially before the 1960s. Id. Available data are dominated by 
a few catastrophic cases. For example, the 1941–1942 drought in China killed an estimated three 
million people due to starvation, and the 1984 drought in Ethiopia likely caused a million 
deaths. Id. Many less catastrophic episodes likely caused deaths and other severe impacts but are 
less likely to have been recorded. 
 16. See JANET N. ABRAMOVITZ, UNNATURAL DISASTERS 23–27 (2001); Cooley, supra note 
14, at 91–92 (discussing how droughts “in the poorest nations reinforce the cycle of poverty”); 
see also infra Section I.B. 
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some regions getting wetter and others drier.17 The United Nations 
Environment Programme reports that these shifts will lead to persistent 
drought and water scarcity in many areas of Africa, the Mediterranean, 
the Middle East, Central Asia, the Indian subcontinent, “southern and 
eastern Australia, northern Mexico, and the southwestern United 
States—a distribution similar to current water-stressed regions.”18 In the 
United States, drought frequency and severity are expected to increase 
markedly, not only in the Southwest, but also in other regions.19 
Despite these serious past and predicted future impacts, however, 
modern societies have developed a generally complacent attitude 
toward drought. This complacency reflects a natural tendency to forget 
bad times once they are over, at least until they return again. John 
Steinbeck expressed that attitude famously in East of Eden: “And it 
never failed that during the dry years people forgot about the rich years, 
and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry years. It was 
always that way.”20 In economic terms: “[A]s a society, we tend to 
place a high discount rate on the future when faced with a crisis.”21 
Complacency occurs in part because drought is a “creeping” 
phenomenon, the onset of which is gradual and therefore difficult to 
identify until serious impacts have already occurred.22 As a result, 
governments usually respond to drought on an emergency basis, and 
measures developed in that atmosphere tend to be reactive rather than 
preventive and proactive.23 Moreover, because even the most serious 
                                                                                                                     
 17. See Robert W. Adler, Climate Change and the Hegemony of State Water Law, 29 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10–17 (2010). 
 18. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 38; see also Aiguo Dai, 
Drought Under Global Warming: A Review, 2 ADVANCED REV. 45, 58–59 (2011) (reviewing 
studies predicting increased aridity due to climate change in Africa, Southern Europe, the 
Middle East, most of the Americas, Australia, and Southeast Asia). 
 19. See CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE COMPENDIUM, supra note 2, at 38–39 (noting that “[i]t 
will likely be only a matter of years before drought becomes the region’s new climatology” and 
predicting that future droughts “will be worse than current extremes”); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE 
RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 42, 75, 83, 
107–08, 112, 120, 123–24, 129–30 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2009) (predicting more frequent 
and more severe droughts). 
 20. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 6 (2002); see also JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 288 (“It 
was hard, when everybody was making money, to remember how fast men could go broke when 
the rain quit.”). 
 21. PETER H. GLEICK & LINDA NASH, THE SOCIETAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF THE 
CONTINUING CALIFORNIA DROUGHT 61 (Pac. Inst. For Studies in Dev., Env’t & Sec., 1991). 
 22. See Kelly T. Redmond, The Depiction of Drought: A Commentary, 2002 BULL. AM. 
METEOROLOGICAL SOC. 1143, 1144 (“Like twilight, drought creeps stealthily into 
existence . . . .”); Donald A. Wilhite & Michael H. Glantz, Understanding the Drought 
Phenomenon: The Role of Definitions, 10 WATER INT’L 111, 111–12 (1985); see also 
ABRAMOWITZ, supra note 16, at 16. 
 23. See INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, WORLD DISASTERS 
REPORT 2009: FOCUS ON EARLY WARNING, EARLY ACTION 131–32 (2009) [hereinafter WORLD 
8
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droughts inevitably give way to more favorable conditions, the public 
and private sectors alike tend to fall prey to what drought experts have 
called the “hydro-illogical” cycle. This phenomenon is characterized by 
panic and ad hoc, reactive approaches in the face of serious drought, 
followed by apathy and a return to past practices once the rains return.24 
The creeping nature of drought generates a difficult policy tension in 
determining when various policy responses to drought (such as relief 
payments or water rationing) should begin. If drought relief is triggered 
too readily, farmers might receive unintended windfalls and be 
encouraged to engage in riskier practices in the future; but if relief 
comes too late, the ability of farmers to recover from drought might be 
impaired. More importantly, complacency and collective loss of 
memory during “the rich times” can lead societies to pursue 
unsustainable water and agricultural policies and practices. Those 
policies and practices, in turn, render regions more vulnerable to the 
effects of drought when dry weather returns. Avoiding this cycle 
requires attention to the definition of drought. 
B.  Drought Definitions 
Drought defies universal definition because it is a relative concept 
that varies with location and economic, social, and political context. 
However, the definition of drought can profoundly change the 
implications of drought response policies. As two prominent drought 
experts noted, “[D]rought, like beauty, is largely defined by the 
beholder and how it may affect his or her activity or enterprise.”25 A 
survey conducted in 1985 identified more than 150 published 
definitions of drought in academic literature.26 The most basic and 
universally accepted definitions compare supply to need—that is, in 
general, drought is a deficiency in precipitation that leads to deficits in 
water supply relative to human and environmental needs.27 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
DISASTERS REPORT 2009]; NAT’L DROUGHT POLICY COMM’N, PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 
21ST CENTURY 1 (2000) [hereinafter PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY]; Donald 
A. Wilhite et al., Drought Preparedness Planning: Building Institutional Capacity, in DROUGHT 
AND WATER CRISES: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 93, 94 (Donald A. 
Wilhite ed., 2005).   
 24. See Wilhite et al., supra note 23, at 94–95. 
 25. Donald A. Wilhite & Margie Buchanan-Smith, Drought as Hazard: Understanding 
the Natural and Social Context, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 3, 6; see also 
PALMER, supra note 10, at 1 (“Drought means various things to various people.”); Redmond, 
supra note 22, at 1147 (“Drought is a many-headed creature, and its full description requires an 
equally diverse menagerie of indices and indicators.”). 
 26. See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 113–15; see also Michael J. Hayes, Types of 
Drought, NATIONAL DROUGHT MITIGATION CENTER, available at http://drought.unl.edu/ 
DroughtBasics/TypesofDrought.aspx (evaluating drought indices). 
 27. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING 
9
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drought has a physical component (deficiency in precipitation) and an 
environmental, social, or economic component (need or demand). 
Experts group drought definitions into four categories.28 
“Meteorological drought” is a sustained reduction in precipitation over a 
defined period of time relative to a defined baseline condition.29 
“Agricultural drought” is a deficiency in soil moisture relative to crop or 
forage needs,30 leading to reduced crop yield or quality or total crop 
failures. “Hydrological drought” is a deficiency in water storage and 
flow in natural or artificial systems, including reduced soil moisture, 
groundwater depth, stream flow, runoff volume, and water levels in 
lakes and reservoirs.31 “Socioeconomic drought” is a deficiency in 
water relative to some economic need or resource, such as livestock 
watering, irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, or municipal and 
industrial use.32 The latter three categories might be grouped together as 
“effects-based” drought definitions. 
This system of categorization, however, does not deal with other 
variables that further complicate policy responses to drought. 
Precipitation, for example, varies relative to geography.33 Levels that 
would be abundant in an arid region might set record lows in a normally 
humid zone.34 Therefore, a legal drought definition that fails to account 
for regional variation could result in perverse policy incentives or 
                                                                                                                     
DROUGHT: THE REPORT TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 4 (1995) [hereinafter NATIONAL STUDY OF 
WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT] (defining drought as “periods of time when natural or 
managed water systems do not provide enough water to meet established human and 
environmental uses because of natural shortfalls in precipitation or streamflow”); Cooley, supra 
note 14, at 92 (defining drought as “a hydrological extreme caused by a persistent and abnormal 
moisture deficiency that has adverse impacts on vegetation, animals, and people over a 
relatively large area”); Wilhite & Buchanan-Smith, supra note 25, at 4 (defining drought as a 
deficiency in precipitation relative to “expected” or “normal” conditions resulting in insufficient 
water to meet human or environmental needs).  
 28. See Richard R. Heim, Jr., A Review of Twentieth-Century Drought Indices Used in the 
United States, 2002 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC. 1149, 1149 (citing 1997 categorization 
by the American Meteorological Society); Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 113; see also 
PALMER, supra note 10, at 1–3.  
 29. See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 113–14. 
 30. See id. at 114–15. 
 31. See id. at 115.  
 32. See id. at 115–16. Arguably, agricultural drought could be considered a subset of 
socioeconomic drought, but it is distinguished by the direct physical relationship between 
meteorological and other related climatic conditions (such as temperature and humidity) and 
both soil moisture and plant needs. 
 33. See id. at 113. 
 34. As such, absolute measures of low precipitation (less than x inches per year) are suited 
only to the specific climates for which they are derived. More relative approaches define 
drought by reference to a percentage of “normal” or “average” precipitation within a region (less 
than x% of average per unit of time), but suggest other difficulties. See id. at 113–14; Hayes, 
supra note 26. 
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socioeconomic impacts. A definition based on conditions in humid 
areas might trigger drought relief too readily in an arid region, leading 
to insufficient incentives to reduce drought risk through more 
sustainable water policies. Conversely, a definition based on arid 
conditions might lead to significant hardship in an area accustomed to 
more abundant water supplies. 
Even within a given region there is no such thing as “normal” 
precipitation, due to significant natural variation.35 Historical data can 
be used to calculate “average” precipitation within an area or to 
characterize the statistical probability of different amounts of 
precipitation within a defined region. However, there is no single 
correct rule defining what variance from an established norm, and over 
what period of time, is appropriate to characterize a deficiency as 
meteorological drought.36 Does drought occur whenever precipitation 
drops below “average,” or only when it deviates from the norm by a 
specified amount, such as the lowest quartile of the normal range? Does 
one month of such deviation suffice to declare a meteorological 
drought, or is a longer period required? Scientific factors might 
influence those decisions, but a policy judgment is necessary to 
determine when drought relief or other governmental response is 
justified; that choice will influence the degree to which the policy 
promotes relief at the expense of risk reduction, or vice versa. 
The definition of meteorological drought can also depend on the 
length of the available historic record and the sources and reliability of 
the information. Even longstanding historic records (of a century or 
more) may not fully characterize the climate within a given region.37 
For example, based on dendochronological research38 and other sources 
                                                                                                                     
 35. See Michael J. Hayes, Comparison of Major Drought Indices: Introduction, NAT’L 
DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., available at http://drought.unl.edu/Planning/Monitoring/ 
ComparisonofIndicesIntro/PercentofNormal.aspx (noting that mean precipitation can vary from 
the median because precipitation often does not reflect a normal probability distribution); 
Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 114 (critiquing use of thirty-year regional mean as definition 
of “normal” precipitation due to significant interannual variability). 
 36. See PALMER, supra note 10, at 2 (noting that all drought definitions reflect some 
degree of arbitrariness); Heim, supra note 28, at 1150 (noting that no single index captures all 
aspects of the drought phenomenon). 
 37. See Kevin Trenberth et al., Exploring Drought and Its Implications for the Future, 85 
EOS 27, 27–29 (2004) (identifying “mega-droughts” based on paleoclimate analysis indicating 
that “the full range of drought variability is potentially much larger than has been seen in the last 
100 years”); Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 114 (noting that “[t]hirty years . . . represents 
only a small part of the historical record for most locations and would not be representative of 
the long-term climatic record”). 
 38. Scientists can correlate the width of annual tree ring growth with available moisture 
and use that information to deduce the amount of runoff within a drainage basin over time, as far 
back as tree rings are available. See, e.g., CHARLES W. STOCKTON & GORDON C. JACOBY, JR., 
LAKE POWELL RESEARCH PROJECT BULL. NO. 18: LONG-TERM SURFACE-WATER SUPPLY AND 
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of information, the past century has been among the wettest in the 
American West for at least the past millennium.39 Thus, if we use 
“below normal” by reference to the past century to characterize drought, 
and if conditions revert to “normal” as defined by the past millennium, 
we can expect persistent “drought” conditions to occur in the future 
even absent additional changes induced by climate disruption. That 
interpretation could result in drought response virtually all of the time, 
converting drought “relief” into a permanent subsidy for water use. 
Even with these definitional complexities, the concept of 
meteorological drought addresses only the supply side of the equation. 
The remaining three categories of drought relate water supply to various 
human needs as well as antecedent conditions. Meteorological drought 
usually precedes agricultural, hydrological, or socioeconomic drought, 
but not always; rather, these types of drought additionally depend on 
prior conditions, either natural or artificial in origin.40 Agricultural 
drought might not follow from meteorological drought if a preceding 
wet period caused significant storage of soil moisture, or if crop water 
needs decline due to cooler temperatures.41 Similarly, whether 
meteorological drought leads to hydrological drought depends on 
preceding water conditions and other factors.42 If a dry year follows a 
wet period in which a lot of water has been stored in the system (soil, 
aquifers, surface water, and reservoirs), physical impacts to natural or 
human water resources may be small. However, even a moderately dry 
year following a long period of incremental reduction in stored water 
can have more significant hydrologic impacts. Other environmental 
variables that affect the hydrologic effects of drought include 
temperature and humidity, which affect evapo-transpiration rates as well 
as precipitation timing and intensity (that is, snow versus rain or steady, 
moderate rain versus infrequent downpours).43 
More importantly, effects-based drought depends on the balance 
between supply and demand, which reflects controllable artificial 
factors and uncontrollable natural conditions.44 For example, we might 
                                                                                                                     
STREAMFLOW TRENDS IN THE UPPER COLORADO RIVER BASIN 3, 4 (1976); Connie A. Woodhouse 
et al., Updated Streamflow Reconstructions for the Upper Colorado River Basin, 42 WATER 
RESOURCES RES. 1, 2 (2006). 
 39. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT: 
EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 108–09 (2007); see also David 
M. Meko et al., Medieval Drought in the Upper Colorado River Basin, 34 GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS 4 (2007). 
 40. See Heim, supra note 28, at 1149; Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 114–15. 
 41. Supra note 40. 
 42. See Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 115. 
 43. Supra note 40. 
 44. See Redmond, supra note 22, at 1144 (commenting that demand factor is more subject 
to human manipulation). 
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prevent or mitigate agricultural drought either by supplementing water 
sources or by reducing water needs—by growing less water-intensive 
crops or crop varieties, fallowing marginal lands, or using more 
efficient irrigation methods.45 Likewise, municipal water demand can be 
reduced through a wide variety of mechanisms, such as real cost and 
accelerating block pricing, other financial incentives, mandatory 
regulations, or rationing.46 Thus, water supplies that might seem 
luxurious to low-demand communities might be considered a severe 
socioeconomic drought in profligate ones. For effects-based drought 
definitions that relate supply to demand, human behavior can “cause” 
droughts through unsustainable land or water use.47 Drought definitions 
that establish a low threshold for relief might relieve serious local or 
regional impacts, but in ways that decrease incentives to reduce drought 
risk and impacts through sustainable water use and management. 
Effects-defined drought can occur more readily due to vulnerability, but 
drought definitions and policies can also exacerbate vulnerability. 
C.  Vulnerability Assessment 
Disaster assessment is a function of both the natural hazard itself (for 
example, the probability that an earthquake of a certain magnitude will 
occur) and the population’s vulnerability to the effects (such as the 
ability of buildings to withstand an earthquake of a particular 
strength).48 Overall risk reflects both the likelihood and potential 
severity of a hazard and the vulnerability of the at-risk population. 
Vulnerability is defined as “the characteristics of a person or group in 
terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from 
the impact of a natural hazard,”49 or more simply as “the potential for 
loss.”50 Actual harm depends on both the likelihood and magnitude of 
the hazard and the ability of various populations to withstand or respond 
                                                                                                                     
 45. See COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 7, at 270–316 (describing various 
water conservation techniques). 
 46. See id. at 243–63; Amy Vickers, Managing Demand: Water Conservation as a 
Drought Mitigation Tool, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISES, supra note 23, at 178–86. 
 47. See PALMER, supra note 10, at 3 (referring to the concept of man-made drought where 
usage exceeds available water supply); Redmond, supra note 22, at 1144 (noting that population 
growth can “turn a dry spell into a drought”); Wilhite & Glantz, supra note 22, at 116 
(commenting that land use can create or exacerbate droughts, citing the Dust Bowl of the 1930s 
and more recent droughts in Africa as examples). 
 48. See generally PIERS BLAIKIE ET AL., AT RISK: NATURAL HAZARDS, PEOPLE’S 
VULNERABILITY, AND DISASTERS 5 (1994) (analyzing vulnerability in terms of the “social, 
economic, and political processes that influence how hazards affect people”). 
 49. Id. at 9. 
 50. Susan L. Cutter, Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards, 20, 4 PROGRESS IN HUMAN 
GEOGRAPHY 529, 529 (1996); see also ADAPTING TO THE IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE, supra 
note 1, at 126–27. 
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to its effects.51 
Vulnerability is a function of geographic factors, such as where 
people live relative to potential natural disasters (floodplains, seismic 
risk zones), plus a range of less easily characterized but equally 
important social, economic, and political factors. Those factors include 
financial reserves and alternative sources of income when livelihoods 
are disrupted, access to physical assets and resources to cope with and 
to recover from hazards, distribution of wealth within a society or 
economy, stability and security of legal and political rights, and 
discrimination between population groups.52 Thus, although poverty is 
one key factor in generating vulnerability, poverty alone neither 
guarantees that particular individuals or groups will be vulnerable to 
particular hazards, nor fully explains why.53 
From a global perspective, it is critical to assess vulnerability to 
drought induced by climate disruption. For people in developing 
countries who already live a marginal existence, relatively small shifts 
in the availability of water and other key resources will have drastic 
adverse impacts on food security.54 Drought and ensuing famine often 
either cause or coincide with armed conflict, and conflict significantly 
exacerbates the effects of drought and famine.55 Experts predict that 
higher temperatures and drought will cause a major food crisis in many 
parts of the world over the next century.56 Those effects are likely to 
produce a crisis of refugees and ensuing internal and external 
conflicts.57 
Even in the United States, scientists predict an increase in the 
frequency, severity, and geographic extent of drought due to climate 
disruption.58 And despite the comparatively large amount of financial, 
technical, and other resources available to adapt to drought in the 
United States, past U.S. drought responses suggest that improvements 
are possible. If more severe and prolonged droughts occur in the United 
                                                                                                                     
51.  See BLAIKIE ET AL., supra note 48, at 9. 
 52. See id. at 9–10; W. Neil Adger & P. Mick Kelly, Social Vulnerability to Climate 
Change and the Architecture of Entitlements, 4 MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR 
GLOBAL CHANGE 253, 258–60 (1999). 
 53. See Adger & Kelly, supra note 52, at 258. 
 54. See AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ET AL., POVERTY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING 
THE VULNERABILITY OF THE POOR THROUGH ADAPTATION (2003) [hereinafter POVERTY AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE]; Hans G. Bohle et al., Climate Change and Social Vulnerability: Toward a 
Sociology and Geography of Food Insecurity, 4 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 37, 37 (1994). 
 55. See BLAIKIE ET AL., supra note 48, at 5, 24 (citing examples in Somalia, Sudan, 
Ethiopia, Chad, Liberia, Angola, and Mozambique). 
 56. See David S. Battisti & Rosamond L. Naylor, Historical Warnings of Future Food 
Insecurity with Unprecedented Seasonal Heat, 323 SCIENCE 240, 241 (2009).  
 57. See Ben Wisner et al., Climate Change and Human Security, RADIXONLINE, 
http://www.radixonline.org/cchs.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 58. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 19. 
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States due to climate disruption, the choice between relief-based 
responses and vulnerability-reducing strategies will become even more 
difficult but even more important. 
While poverty is the main source of vulnerability in the developing 
world, inefficiency may be the most significant culprit in the developed 
world. In countries with access to sufficient capital and engineering 
expertise, the traditional approach to imbalances between supply and 
demand has been to increase water storage or supply.59 Therefore, 
regions with high water demand, such as agricultural areas that depend 
on irrigation, experience more serious impacts from a given shortage 
than areas with lower water needs. Likewise, growing cities that fail to 
curb per capita water use or to reduce leaks and other sources of 
inefficiency in their storage and delivery systems will be more 
vulnerable to drought than more efficient regions. Of course, efficiency 
improvements will only decrease vulnerability if the “saved” water 
really functions as a reserve to guard against future drought, and not to 
fuel additional growth.60 Moreover, government investments, subsidies, 
and other incentives can promote excess water use and development in 
drought-prone regions in ways that increase vulnerability. A comparison 
of responses to two historically significant droughts highlights these 
issues. 
1.  The Dust Bowl Experience in the Great Plains 
The history of farming and ranching in the Great Plains exemplifies 
the boom-and-bust cycles and patterns of complacency61 that can 
increase vulnerability even in wealthy and resilient societies. The Great 
Plains has been vulnerable to devastating boom-and-bust cycles over the 
past 150 years, and the downturns usually coincided with severe 
drought.62 Aided by U.S. government land policies designed to promote 
westward expansion, and encouraged by railroad companies, land 
speculators, and newspapers formed largely to promote those interests, 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 7, at 101 (arguing that “[m]ost water 
supply schemes need to incorporate reservoirs”). See generally WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, 
DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING (2000). 
 60. Some argue that inefficiency is a useful buffer against drought because efficiency 
improvements can be tapped when needed during a drought. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER 
MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 20. Except for simple rationing programs, 
however, which can be disruptive, water efficiency improvements often require time and money 
to implement and cannot simply be turned on or off when drought hits. 
 61. See supra notes 20–24 and accompanying text. 
 62. See generally THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11 (describing various 
droughts suffered in the Great Plains); JOHNSON, supra note 11; DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 
11; Opie, supra note 11; Deborah Epstein Popper & Frank J. Popper, The Great Plains: From 
Dust to Dust, PLANNING (Dec. 1987), at 12; William E. Riebsame, Sustainability of the Great 
Plains in an Uncertain Climate, 1 GREAT PLAINS RES. 133 (1991). 
15
Adler: Balancing Compassion And Risk In Climate Adaptation: U.S. Water,
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
216 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
settlers from the East flocked to the Great Plains during the late 1800s 
and early 1900s.63 Those migrants were lured by the promise of 
economic self-sufficiency, cheap and fertile land, and favorable 
weather. However, they brought farming practices and assumptions 
about weather rooted in the cultural knowledge of Europe and the 
eastern United States, but that ultimately were unsustainable in the very 
different and highly variable climate of the Great Plains.64 
Farmers and ranchers in the Great Plains fell victim to the “hydro-
illogical” cycle.65 Settlers overstocked the range and overplanted crops 
during favorable weather and high prices, leading to serious failures 
during drought, excess summer heat, and freezing winters.66 
Government policies and economic conditions encouraged boom cycles 
when commodity prices rose and export markets expanded; and booms 
were driven by advancements in agricultural technology, such as the 
steel plow, the gasoline-powered tractor, and the combine.67 Thus, as 
with overuse of water, ultimately an excess use or misuse of resources 
(land, capital, and technology) during the rich times, rather than simply 
an absence of resources during the poor times, contributed to the 
vulnerability of Great Plains agriculturalists to drought. 
The ultimate example came during the Dust Bowl years of the Great 
Depression, which devastated both the land and its settlers.68 The 
physical causes of the Dust Bowl were the heat and drought—the worst 
to date in the measured meteorological record throughout much of the 
United States.69 However, similar conditions of wind, drought, and heat 
had occurred previously, without the dramatic dust storms, soil erosion, 
and other catastrophic environmental impacts.70 Overgrazing denuded 
                                                                                                                     
 63. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 30–31; Popper & Popper, supra note 62, at 
12–13; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 40–44; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 
35–37, 46–63, 71–80. 
 64. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 57–58; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, 
supra note 11, at 27–28, 64; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 38. Static views about farming and 
weather also led to false assumptions in Australia, South Africa, and other regions in which 
Europeans introduced historical practices in very different climates. See Donald A. Wilhite et 
al., National Drought Policy: Lessons Learned from Australia, South Africa, and the United 
States, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 137, 149, 153–54. 
 65. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 66. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 53–62; JOHNSON, supra note 
11, at 35–38, 55–63, 75–91, 101–05, 109–22. 
 67. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 40–42; JOHNSON, supra note 
11, at 35, 37, 77, 109–10, 112–14, 116, 127–35. 
 68. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 40–42; JOHNSON, supra note 
11, at 155–96; PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at vii. 
 69. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 8–9. 
 70. In the native prairies of the region, a dense and diverse flora of drought-resistant 
grasses stabilized the soil during periods of high winds, and the native species evolved to 
withstand periods of heat, cold, aridity, and rain. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra 
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the natural rangelands, and mechanical plowing, cultivation, and harvest 
in long, straight rows exposed the underlying topsoil to the effects of 
heat, wind, and drought.71 
Likewise, the Dust Bowl highlights the relationship between 
unsustainable fiscal and economic policies and drought vulnerability. 
Enticed by easy access to credit and optimism that land values and 
commodity prices would inevitably continue to rise, farmers and 
absentee owners saddled themselves with mortgages and chattel debt to 
finance a new generation of efficient but expensive equipment to 
support the industrial farm economy.72 When crop prices declined 
dramatically or when crop yields fell or failed altogether due to drought 
and the accompanying dust storms, this speculation and leverage could 
not be sustained. Land values plummeted, and farmers had no reserves 
to cover their debt and to buy seed grain or livestock feed to carry them 
through the protracted drought. This left insufficient equity to cover 
loans, leading to farm failures, bankruptcies, foreclosures, and bank 
failures.73 
The U.S. government responded to the Dust Bowl with drought 
relief and other agricultural policies designed both to provide 
compassionate assistance to farmers and to change farming practices to 
prevent similar effects in the future.74 Some policies sought to reduce 
vulnerability through more sustainable farming practices, such as 
conservation tillage, planting of windbreaks, and return of marginal 
farmlands to native grasses.75 Price supports, bankruptcy relief, and 
crop insurance were adopted to reduce the financial vulnerability of 
affected communities to natural variables such as drought and to 
fluctuations in domestic and global agricultural markets.76 However, as 
                                                                                                                     
note 11, at 23; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 164–66; Popper & Popper, supra note 61, at 16 
(quoting a late nineteenth century Pawnee chief in northeast Colorado who lamented, “Grass [is] 
no good upside down”). 
 71. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11, at 27, 32, 40, 43, 49; JOHNSON, 
supra note 11, at 37, 114–15, 165–66. 
 72. See DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11, at 30; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra 
note 11, at 42, 45, 53; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 122, 130–32. 
 73. See THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 10, at 45, 53–54; JOHNSON, supra 
note 11, at 122, 130–32. 
 74. See infra Subsection II.B.2.b. 
 75. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 198–201, 218–20, 227–28, 231–44. 
 76. See id. at 213–14, 227–28; William S. Eubanks, II, The Sustainable Farm Bill: A 
Proposal for Permanent Environmental Change, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,493, 10,494–95 (2009); 
L. Leon Geyer, Risk-Sharing Down on the Farm: A Comparison of Farmer Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Statutes or Selling the Farm, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 332–34 (1997); Opie, supra 
note 11, at 250–51. See generally DONALD A. WILHITE, NORMAN J. ROSENBERG & MICHAEL H. 
GLANTZ, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO DROUGHT IN THE UNITED STATES, LESSONS FROM THE MID-
1970S, PART 2, THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE IN THE GREAT PLAINS, 1850–1950S (1984) 
[hereinafter THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE]. 
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discussed further in Part II, some of those policies can contribute to 
vulnerability by distorting risk decisions by farmers about what crops to 
grow and under what conditions. 
The federal government also subsidized a large system of dams to 
store water for irrigation during times of low precipitation in the Great 
Plains.77 Widespread use of the centrifugal pump to power deep wells 
and center pivot irrigation systems later allowed farmers to tap into the 
High Plains aquifer.78 As a result, Great Plains farmers no longer need 
to rely entirely on precipitation to support millions of farmed acres. 
Productivity has increased even further due to hybrid crops, fertilizers, 
pesticides, and herbicides.79 This technologically assisted increase in 
productivity, however, is unlikely to last indefinitely. Groundwater 
levels in the High Plains aquifer have plummeted,80 and water demand 
for crops and livestock will increase with rising temperatures.81 These 
factors may once again render the Great Plains vulnerable to drought 
caused by climate disruption. 
2.  Comparison to Recent Droughts in California 
In 1988, drought blanketed large portions of the United States, from 
California to the Northwest, eastward to the Northern Rockies and the 
Upper Midwest, and as far south as Georgia. The drought was most 
pronounced in California and other western states, where it persisted 
through 1992.82 Because of improved response capability, a much more 
diversified economy, and the increased capacity and resilience of water 
and agricultural infrastructure in California and other parts of the United 
States, however, both the response to the California drought and its 
social, economic, and human impacts were vastly different than those 
experienced during the Dust Bowl. It would reflect another form of 
complacency, however, to assume that the same would be true if even 
longer and more severe droughts occur due to climate disruption. 
From a meteorological perspective, the California drought of the late 
1980s and early 1990s was as severe as that of the late 1920s and early 
                                                                                                                     
 77. See Popper & Popper, supra note 62, at 14. 
 78. See JOHN OPIE, OGALLALA: WATER FOR A DRY LAND 129–32, 146–49 (1993). 
 79. See Eubanks, supra note 76, at 10, 497–98. 
 80. See OPIE, supra note 78, at 5–6, 162–65; U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FACT SHEET FS-
078-03: WATER-LEVEL CHANGES IN THE HIGH PLAINS AQUIFER, PREDEVELOPMENT TO 2001, 1999 
TO 2000, AND 2000 TO 2001 (2003); DAVID E. KROMM & STEPHEN E. WHITE, CONSERVING 
WATER IN THE HIGH PLAINS 1–3 (1990). 
 81. See GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 19, at 124 
(“Current water use on the Great Plains is unsustainable, as the High Plains aquifer continues to 
be tapped faster than the rate of recharge.”). 
 82. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER RESOURCES: FEDERAL EFFORTS TO 
MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT 2 (1993) [hereinafter FEDERAL EFFORTS TO 
MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT]. 
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1930s, and in some parts of the state it was the worst in the twentieth 
century.83 Some sources estimated gross agricultural losses in excess of 
$500 million and increased ratepayer electric costs in the range of $3 
billion.84 However, the California drought did not cause the massive 
economic, social, and political impacts that similar droughts caused 
during the Great Depression. The water resources infrastructure 
developed by the federal and state governments and the private sector 
since the early twentieth century buffered the region against the full 
effects of the drought.85 Because it has a sufficiently sophisticated set of 
legal and political institutions, California reduced demand through 
efficiency improvements adopted, encouraged, or required by municipal 
and agricultural users, and reallocated water among users through water 
banks and other market tools.86 Still, by the end of the drought, reserves 
of both surface water and groundwater had declined, meaning that more 
serious impacts might have occurred if the drought had continued. 
California is unlikely to be able to “store its way” out of the more 
severe and protracted declines in precipitation and snowpack expected 
due to climate disruption.87 Moreover, reservoirs and extensive related 
                                                                                                                     
 83. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 4–5; NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER 
MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 23. 
 84. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 29 n.4, 35, 45. Other impacts included 
increased monetary and energy costs to pump and move water, lost hydroelectrical generation 
and higher costs to replace it (in money and pollution), reduced agricultural income and 
increased costs to purchase livestock feed and other inputs, millions of dollars in losses due to 
depleted salmon stocks, declining waterfowl populations, increased forest fires and ensuing 
damage to property and natural resources, declining tourism and recreation, especially to the ski 
industry, diminished supplies to municipal users, and weakened natural ecosystems. Id. at 17–
58. 
 85. Colorado River water stored in Lake Mead and Lake Powell during the early 1980s 
offset shortages from other sources, and California’s own system of more than 150 major 
reservoirs provided additional reserves during the early years of the drought. As a result, 
California farmers did not face reduced water deliveries for at least the first three years of the 
drought. Additional water stored in aquifers offset declining surface water supplies. See id. at 5; 
see also NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 25. 
 86. See generally BRENT M. HADDAD, RIVERS OF GOLD: DESIGNING MARKETS TO 
ALLOCATE WATER IN CALIFORNIA (2000) (describing California’s water allocation system and 
its complex legal approach to water rights). Those programs and transactions have been 
criticized on numerous grounds as insufficient, inefficient, and not reflective of true markets. 
See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, Climate Disruption, the Washington Consensus, and Water 
Law Reform, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 383, 422–28 (2008); Morris Israel & Jay R. Lund, Recent 
California Water Transfers: Implications for Water Management, 35 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 5, 
14 (1995). There is little doubt, however, that the effects of the drought would have been worse 
absent those market-based water transfers. 
 87. See Ajay Kalra et al., Changes in U.S. Streamflow and Western U.S. Snowpack, 13 J. 
HYDROLOGIC ENGINEERING 156, 156 (2008); Philip W. Mote, Climate-Driven Variability and 
Trends in Mountain Snowpack in Western North America, 19 J. CLIMATE 6209, 6209 (2006); 
Philip W. Mote et al., Declining Mountain Snowpack in Western North America, 2005 BULL. 
AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 39, 39. 
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water diversions and conveyances cause serious environmental impacts 
that reduce the health of ecosystems in other ways.88 
The California drought was also buffered by the diverse economies 
of California and other affected states, and by the size, diversity, 
flexibility, and economic strength of the United States as a whole. 
Although some economic sectors incurred more harm than others, the 
economy of the state and the region was better able to withstand the 
effects of the drought because some sources of jobs and income are 
relatively less dependent on water than others, and because resulting tax 
and other revenues could be invested in drought response and relief 
efforts.89 Even within California, if the market functions properly, gross 
income from declining yields can be offset in part by increased crop 
prices due to declining supplies.90 Moreover, given the national or 
international scope of agricultural markets, the absence of trade barriers, 
and the presence of functional markets within the country, declines in 
crop yields in one region can be offset by increased production 
elsewhere, as in fact occurred during the California drought.91 
D.  Implications for Drought Mitigation in a Disrupted Climate 
The nature and characterization of drought suggest several distinct 
focal points for the analysis of future law and policy. First, viewed from 
the perspective of meteorological drought, and as Dean David Getches 
and Professor Janet Neuman have both noted independently, we need to 
abandon the concept of drought as an aberrational phenomenon, rather 
than as a regular part of the inherently variable climates of particular 
regions.92 Conceptualizing drought as an aberrational phenomenon 
                                                                                                                     
 88. See ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED 
SENSE OF IMMENSITY 55–69 (2007). 
 89. For example, large southern California municipalities were able to pay farmers in the 
Imperial Valley to fallow land and to improve irrigation efficiency in ways that allowed more 
water to be conveyed to the thirsty, still thriving cities. See Israel & Lund, supra note 86, at 7–
11; Kevin M. O’Brien & Robert R. Gunning, Water Marketing in California Revisited: The 
Legacy of the 1987–92 Drought, 25 PAC. L.J. 1053, 1054 (1994). 
 90. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 29–30. 
 91. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 
14. Shifts in regional production cause distributive changes in farm income. However, given that 
drought strikes different agricultural areas over longer periods of time, temporary distributive 
effects can even out over time, with each region gaining or losing relative market share during 
different periods. Moreover, if the locus of agricultural production shifts in the face of regional 
drought, a country as a whole will not face food shortages and resulting malnutrition. The ability 
of farmers in a drought-stricken region to withstand temporary shifts in production and income, 
however, depends on their overall economic condition, cash and other reserves, or the existence 
of government risk allocation programs (price supports, crop insurance, or otherwise) to carry 
them through the crisis. In California, the agricultural sector was strong enough to bear the 
drought impacts. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 39. 
 92. See, e.g., Getches, supra note 13, at 7 (critiquing water policies that assume “normal” 
or “average” precipitation); Janet C. Neuman, Drought Proofing Water Law, 7 U. DENV. WATER 
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encourages maximum use of water during wet periods, leaving little or 
no resilience to drought during drier periods. Of course, any statistical 
probability curve has high and low extremes, at increasingly remote 
levels of probability. Thus, even an approach to water law and policy 
that considers a range of expected conditions must reflect some policy 
decision about what extreme conditions should be considered 
aberrational—that is, beyond the range of probability for which prudent 
managers should be expected to plan. Moreover, climate change now 
introduces a considerable amount of additional uncertainty about the 
range of expected precipitation and other conditions (such as 
temperature and evaporation rates) that affect water resources supply 
and demand, and the frequency with which drought conditions should 
be expected relative to past cycles. 
Second, the three effects-based definitions of drought (agricultural, 
hydrologic, and socioeconomic), all of which reflect an imbalance 
between available water supply and some aspect of human or 
environmental demand, suggest that drought response must focus on 
both the supply and demand sides of the equation. Drought relief and 
response efforts that rely exclusively on financial aid and emergency 
water supplies will miss important opportunities for drought mitigation, 
particularly those that can be implemented in advance of drought. 
Vulnerability analysis suggests some of these same lessons for 
drought response, but it unearths other lessons as well. Societies will be 
vulnerable to drought if they push the limits of water resources during 
wet periods, leaving little or no reserve during drought. Adequate 
reserves will become increasingly important if droughts become more 
frequent and more severe due to climate disruption because there will be 
little to no time for recovery between droughts. Likewise, because 
wasteful societies will be more vulnerable to drought, future drought 
prevention and response efforts should focus as much on demand-side 
strategies as on supply-side strategies. Vulnerability analysis, however, 
also suggests that policymakers should focus on broader policies that 
drive decisions about how much water is used and for what purposes. 
Those policies include government subsidies and insurance policies, as 
well as the levels of risk deemed appropriate by private financial 
markets. Further, drought policies might include broader economic and 
resource-based strategies to prevent and mitigate drought risks, such as 
restoring ecosystem components that can buffer drought impacts 
(including wetlands, floodplains, and other natural water storage areas), 
diversifying economically in drought-prone regions, establishing legal 
and market institutions to reallocate water and products produced with 
                                                                                                                     
L. REV. 92, 94–96 (2003) (noting that both droughts and floods are just extremes of the 
spectrum of “normal” or “average” conditions). 
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water, and designing relief strategies to promote self-reliance, rather 
than dependence or risky economic decisions that perpetuate cycles of 
vulnerability. 
II.  U.S. WATER, DROUGHT, AND AGRICULTURAL LAW IN A DISRUPTED 
CLIMATE 
Water law allocates a scarce resource among competing users and 
defines rights and interests in that resource according to a predictable 
set of rules. Thus, it would be logical to assume that water law would 
have the most influence on the use and allocation of water during times 
of greatest scarcity, and therefore the most impact on behavior and 
vulnerability in anticipation of and during a drought. It is notable, then, 
that drought experts have referred to existing law as imposing 
constraints on sound drought management and policy, rather than 
serving as a beneficial tool.93 Law governing water allocation during 
drought poses a balance between compassion and risk because water is 
essential to lives and livelihoods, but guaranteed water has the potential 
to encourage waste and thereby to increase vulnerability. 
A disconnect arguably exists between water law and drought policy 
in the United States for several reasons. First, although state water law 
varies considerably,94 by and large it addresses drought planning and 
response as an afterthought. Especially in the arid and semi-arid regions 
of the country most prone to drought, state water law is primarily an 
instrument of water resource development,95 and drought policies 
generally have been tacked on incidentally in response to drought 
emergencies. Second, to the significant extent that federal law also 
influences water resources,96 it too is generally designed to promote 
resource development rather than sustainable water use and 
conservation.97 Third, agriculture is the second largest consumptive user 
of water in the United States (after thermoelectric power plants, which 
use huge volumes of water for cooling); and agriculture is especially 
dominant in areas historically prone to drought.98 Since the New Deal, 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See, e.g., Wilhite et al., supra note 23, at 103.  
 94. In the United States, water law is largely dictated by individual states. See Adler, 
supra note 17, at 4–5. 
 95. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317, 
320–21 (1985). 
 96. See Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests Vs. State 
Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 241, 253; David H. 
Getches, The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions 
Eclipsed the State Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 8 (2001). 
 97. See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 
1013–37 (1995); Hamilton Candee, The Broken Promise of Reclamation Reform, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 657, 657–58 (1989). 
 98. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED WATER USE IN THE UNITED 
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federal intervention in agricultural markets, especially for the largest 
commodity crops,99 is arguably the dominant factor driving production 
in the agricultural sector, including decisions affecting water use.100 
Therefore, analysis of U.S. drought law and policy and the changes 
needed in the face of climate disruption should focus on both federal 
and state law, and on both agricultural and water law.101 What is 
remarkably constant across these areas of law, however, is the tension 
between the goals of providing drought relief (compassion) and 
reducing drought vulnerability (risk). 
A.  State Law and Policy 
The major doctrines of U.S. water law are not well suited to 
problems of scarcity.102 This is ironic because, absent scarcity, “the role 
of water law is relatively insignificant.”103 As such, the question 
becomes what modifications to water law are warranted as a means of 
adaptation to drought. 
1.  State Water Law and Policy 
The manner in which water law might address drought can be 
viewed from two perspectives: (1) the policy question of what goals we 
want to achieve during drought, and (2) the structural question of what 
legal means are best suited to achieve those goals. One potential goal of 
water law is to buffer water users from the adverse impacts of drought, 
either by enhancing or rationing water supplies or by providing 
economic compensation or relief. An alternative policy goal, however, 
is to provide incentives for more water sustainable practices to reduce 
                                                                                                                     
STATES 2005 (2009). 
 99. A “commodity” crop is an agricultural product that is easy to store and transport (as 
opposed to being quickly perishable) and can therefore be traded on large scales or stored, 
depending on market conditions. See Charlene C. Kwan, Note, Fixing the Farm Bill: Using the 
“Permanent Provisions” in Agricultural Law to Achieve WTO Compliance, 36 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 571, 574 (2009). 
 100. See id.; Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon and Conservation: Rethinking U.S. 
Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 593, 597–98 
(2010); John H. Davidson, The Federal Farm Bill and the Environment, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 3, 4 (2003). 
 101. Other sectors of the economy, of course, can also have significant water demands. 
This analysis focuses on agricultural water use and demand because of its predominance in the 
water economy. 
 102. Adler, supra note 17, at 18–26; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting Riparian Rights to 
the Twenty-First Century, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 539, 543–44 (2004); A. Dan Tarlock, Now, Think 
Again About Adaptation, 9 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 173–75 (1992); Frank J. Trelease, 
Climatic Change and Water Law, in CLIMATE, CLIMATIC CHANGE, AND WATER SUPPLY 70, 70–
71 (1977). 
 103. Christine A. Klein et al., Modernizing Water Law: The Example of Florida, 61 FLA. L. 
REV. 403, 409 (2009). 
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the frequency and impact of effects-based drought. Consistent with the 
thesis of this Article, however, those two goals may conflict. The 
knowledge that government relief is likely during drought can reduce 
incentives to take precautionary measures against it. 
Structurally, there are several possible approaches to drought in 
water law. The first, “drought neutrality,” would maintain uniform rules 
of water law regardless of the balance between water supply and 
demand at any given time, that is, any separate body of “drought law” 
would not modify the general rules of water law. Indeed, if water law is 
significant mainly in times of scarcity, and if the background system of 
water law is modified significantly for scarcity conditions, then the 
exception would swallow the rule. In theory, under a drought-neutral 
approach, stable legal rules would allow the market to allocate water in 
scarcity as well as abundance, while providing incentives to use water 
efficiently. As such, there would be no need for special drought 
allocation rules. Water users would make risk decisions on the basis of 
the background legal regime and have an incentive to use market 
mechanisms to reallocate water more efficiently.104 In theory, those with 
preferred rights would have an incentive to use water more efficiently 
so they would have more rights to sell during shortages; those with less 
preferred legal rights would also have an incentive to conserve in order 
to avoid unnecessary purchase costs. Over time, these incentives might 
prompt rational parties to engage in more sustainable water practices in 
advance, rather than waiting for a drought to occur. Various aspects of 
U.S. water law, however, impose barriers to such efficient marketing of 
water rights.105 As a result, “winners” under the prevailing legal regimes 
do not necessarily have significant incentive to conserve. 
The second approach, “drought exceptionalism,” would modify the 
usual rules of water law during periods of drought to provide relief to 
affected users or to allocate the risk of loss in a manner that differs from 
what would occur under nondrought conditions. A threshold question 
regarding drought exceptionalism is how to define the exception—that 
is, how to establish the conditions under which background rules are 
modified or under which some form of relief is provided. This threshold 
question obviously relates to the problems of drought definition already 
                                                                                                                     
 104. See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 173–74 (describing “[w]ater marketing,” a similar 
approach calling for “the voluntary sale and transfer of existing rights to new uses,” which is 
currently the “remedy of choice to reallocate more water to higher valued uses”); Trelease, 
supra note 102, at 73 (describing water reallocation in terms of economic incentives). 
 105. See CRAIG BELL & JEFF TAYLOR, WATER LAWS AND POLICIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE 
FUTURE: A WESTERN STATES’ PERSPECTIVE 109–22 (2008); Dellapenna, supra note 102, at 573; 
C. Peter Goplerud III, The Permit Process and Colorado’s Exception, in 2 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS § 14.04 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); Tarlock, supra note 102, at 173. But see Jedediah 
Brewer et al., Transferring Water in the American West: 1987–2005, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
1021, 1041–50 (2007). 
24
Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol64/iss1/4
2012] BALANCING COMPASSION AND RISK IN CLIMATE ADAPTATION 225 
 
discussed. If there is no clear ex ante definition of drought, water users 
have insufficient signals by which to alter their conduct or to assess the 
real risk of loss under various conditions. If a water law regime triggers 
special drought provisions too readily, the background rules become 
largely irrelevant, as suggested above, and users have little incentive to 
take actions to prevent or otherwise provide for shortages. 
The third and most common approach to drought in water law is, for 
want of a better term, ad hoc. This approach responds to individual 
droughts with specific changes that either remain embedded in the 
background system of water law, or expire when the emergency ends or 
is perceived to have ended. The ad hoc approach has the benefit of 
flexibility because water law modifications and relief provisions can be 
tailored to variable drought conditions and impacts. Different impacts 
on human and environmental water uses might suggest different legal 
and policy responses. An ad hoc approach leaves water users with less 
clear signals by which to assess risk. Ironically, however, compared to a 
system of drought exceptionalism with hairpin triggers for relief, the 
very uncertainty that the ad hoc approach creates might actually 
increase incentives to engage in preventive and more sustainable 
behavior. If the government establishes a pattern of frequent or 
inevitable relief, on the other hand, incentives will evaporate, even if the 
precise nature of the relief varies. 
The system of riparian rights, which is prevalent in the eastern 
United States, generally assumes abundant supplies that can be divided 
equitably among competing users, so long as uses are reasonable and do 
not unduly interfere with the rights of other users.106 Pure riparian rights 
systems, in theory, allocate scarce water among competing users 
according to equitable factors, requiring everyone to share in the risk of 
scarcity.107 That system works so long as each user retains enough water 
to continue economically viable uses; however, if the resulting cutbacks 
leave all (or most) users below the minimum level necessary to remain 
viable, then the perverse result is all losers and no winners.108 Even 
under common law administration of riparian rights, however, courts 
have often established de facto preferences among users, but without 
statutory guidance on how to make such choices and with an apparent 
preference for large water users.109 Moreover, especially under 
                                                                                                                     
 106. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Right to Consume Water Under “Pure” Riparian 
Rights, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 7.02(c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). 
 107. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850A (1979); Adler, supra note 17, at 19; 
Dellapenna, supra note 105, § 7.02(d)(3). 
 108. See Adler, supra note 17, at 19. 
 109. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at 
the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 14–16 (2002) 
(illustrating how courts may account for economic impacts when deciding water rights cases). 
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emergency conditions, it is extremely inefficient to address shortages 
via case-by-case litigation. The uncertainty and instability inherent in 
such case-specific allocation leaves large water users, who typically 
receive greater judicial protection, with little or no incentive to engage 
in more sustainable practices. Under more recent statutory and 
administrative systems of riparian rights, statutory preferences operate 
much as they might in prior appropriation states, with the same weak 
incentives for conservation.110 The administrative process, however, 
allows allocation decisions to be made more efficiently and before use, 
rather than in a post hoc dispute.111 An administrative system also 
allows agencies to impose efficiency requirements as a condition of 
water use permits. 
Under the prior appropriation doctrine, which prevails in the arid 
western United States, rights are assigned according to priority of 
use.112 Thus, because senior appropriators are entitled to their full 
apportionment before junior appropriators receive any water, the system 
avoids the “everyone loses” problem.113 Under this system, however, 
the “winners” still have little incentive to conserve until water is so 
scarce that they, too, face shortages. In theory, prior appropriation 
incorporates a prohibition against waste and limits water rights to 
“beneficial use,” defined in part by reference to the amount of water 
reasonably necessary to support the intended use.114 In practice, 
however, those tenets of prior appropriation law have been enforced 
weakly (at best).115 Moreover, although prior appropriation may allocate 
scarce water more efficiently in drought than is true under riparian 
rights, it does so in ways that tend to embed historic uses at the expense 
of economic efficiency or other societal preferences. Impediments to 
water marketing have limited its effectiveness in reallocating scarce 
water to uses that are either economically or environmentally more 
valuable.116 Finally, because abundant storage and conveyance systems 
have buffered arid western states from significant problems of scarcity 
thus far, the prior appropriation system has not yet been tested 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 
§ 9.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991); Dellapenna, supra note 102, at 586–88. 
 111. See Klein et al., supra note 103, at 411. 
 112. See Robert E. Beck, Prevalence and Definition, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 
§ 12.03(b), (c) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991). 
 113. See Adler, supra note 17, at 24; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Adapting the Law of Water 
Management to Global Climate Change and Other Hydropolitical Stresses, 35 J. AM. WATER 
RESOURCES ASS’N. 1301, 1305 (1999); Trelease, supra note 102, at 72. 
 114. See Beck, supra note 112, § 12.03(c)(2). 
 115. See Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search 
for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919, 975 (1998). 
 116. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; Adler, supra note 17, at 25–26. 
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extensively in times of extreme drought.117 
Neither riparian rights nor prior appropriation, therefore, provide 
significant incentives for efficiency improvements designed to reduce 
drought vulnerability. The next question is whether states have modified 
those legal regimes in ways that do so, or whether they focus more on 
short-term relief. 
2.  State Drought Law and Policy 
In many state water law systems, drought is not addressed as a 
distinct concept—the drought-neutrality approach. Professor Robert 
Beck’s classic two-volume treatise on water law addresses the topic of 
drought only rarely, and even then as an adjunct to other topics.118 State 
water law is not, however, entirely drought-neutral. There are notable 
exceptions in the law of some states in which water rights and 
obligations can be modified in the event of drought, or which provide 
for other responses to drought conditions.119  
The closest thing to a universal state response to drought is 
contingency planning, sometimes done as a requirement of state law.120 
Although comprehensive state drought planning is a relatively recent 
phenomenon,121 to the extent that drought plans identify response 
                                                                                                                     
 117. See Tarlock, supra note 102, at 175–76.  
 118. See Robert E. Beck, The Uses of and Demands for Water, in 1 WATERS AND WATER 
RIGHTS § 2.01 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991) (discussing the failure of the 1961 Senate Select 
Committee’s attempts to plan for water shortages and the National Water Commission’s later 
view that such planning was not of significant concern). Ironically, the authors of that treatise 
discuss efforts by riparian states, as opposed to the more arid prior appropriation states, to plan 
for shortages via regulated riparianism, see Joseph W. Dellapenna, Regulated Riparianism, in 1 
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 9.05(d), supra, and discuss and critique the fact that many states 
address drought only through contingency emergency planning rather than imposing more 
restrictive conditions under conditions of both plenty and scarcity, Robert E. Beck, 
Appropriable Waters, in 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 13.01, supra. 
 119. See, e.g., Melinda Kassen, Statutory Expansion of State Agencies’ Authority to 
Administer and Develop Water Resources in Response to Colorado’s Drought, 7 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV 47, 48–50  (2003); Neuman, supra note 92 (discussing how “drought is a normal 
and recurrent feature of the climate throughout the United States”). 
 120. E.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.116(III) (2011) (requiring N.Y. State 
Drought Management Task Force to approve a State Drought Management Coordination Plan); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-715 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring the state and local governments to 
create and update, for fully appropriated basins, river basin management plans that consider, 
inter alia, drought conditions and water supply); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3112(a)(1) (West 
2009) (mandating state and regional water plans for both normal and drought conditions). 
 121. The first state to adopt a comprehensive drought management plan was Colorado, in 
1981. Polly Ann Najarian, An Analysis of State Drought Plans: A Model Drought Plan Proposal 
(Dec. 2000) (unpublished M.S. thesis, University of Nebraska at Lincoln), at 5. By December,  
2010, forty-four states had drought plans, one had delegated drought planning to local 
authorities, and  three states were in the process of plan development. Drought Planning 
Resources, by State, NAT’L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., http://drought.unl.edu/Planning/ 
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strategies and criteria in advance, the trend suggests a shift away from a 
purely ad hoc, reactive approach to drought response. Moreover, 
comprehensive drought management plans can generate objective 
signals by which water users might guide decisions about water use and 
drought risk. A series of government agencies and commissions have 
concluded that more comprehensive drought policies are needed to 
anticipate and to mitigate drought impacts.122 In response, many states 
have adopted drought management plans, guided in part by the 
recommendations of Professor Donald Wilhite and his colleagues at the 
National Drought Management Center at the University of Nebraska.123 
That work recommends that drought planning focus on advance 
mitigation to reduce vulnerability,124 as well as monitoring, prediction, 
response, and relief during droughts.125 It also notes that providing 
compensation without regard to whether preventive measures had been 
taken disincentivizes mitigation.126  
Drought mitigation plans alone, however, do not ensure a risk 
reduction approach, as opposed to one that focuses on providing relief 
when droughts occur. Many current state plans continue to focus largely 
on response; only a few have shifted to mitigation and prevention to 
reduce vulnerability.127 The content of state drought response plans, of 
course, must reflect the relevant substantive aspects of state laws and 
regulations, which vary considerably in the manner in which they 
balance the goals of drought relief and risk reduction. There are 
legitimate reasons why state drought plans and legal provisions might 
                                                                                                                     
PlanningInfobyState.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 122. See, e.g., WESTERN GOVERNORS’ POLICY OFFICE (WESTPO), INSTITUTE FOR POLICY 
RESEARCH, MANAGING RESOURCE SCARCITY: LESSONS FROM THE MID-SEVENTIES DROUGHT, A 
REPORT FOR THE GOVERNORS ON DROUGHT MANAGEMENT 34–36 (1978) [hereinafter MANAGING 
RESOURCE SCARCITY]; NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra 
note 27, at v–vii, 17–19; PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at v–vi, 
1, 33; W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N., DROUGHT RESPONSE ACTION PLAN 1, 3 (1996). 
 123. See Donald A. Wilhite, A Methodology for Drought Preparedness, 13 NAT. HAZARDS 
229, 231, 251 (1996) [hereinafter Wilhite, A Methodology for Drought Preparedness]; Donald 
A. Wilhite, Drought Planning: A Process for State Government, 27 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 
29, 30 (1991) [hereinafter Drought Planning: A Process for State Government]; Najarian, supra 
note 121. See generally CODY KNUTSON ET AL., HOW TO REDUCE DROUGHT RISK (1998) 
(describing actions that should be taken to reduce the potential impacts from droughts before the 
droughts occur).  
 124. “Mitigation is defined as actions taken in advance of or in the early stages of drought 
that reduce the impacts of the event.” Wilhite et al., supra note 23, at 118. For potential risk 
reduction actions listed by the Center, see CODY KNUTSON ET AL., supra note 123, at E-1 to E-5. 
 125. See Najarian, supra note 121, at 5–8, 31–34; Wilhite, A Methodology for Drought 
Preparedness, supra note 123, at 239–40. 
 126. See Najarian, supra note 121, at 9. 
 127. See id. at 5, 68–70; Donald A. Wilhite, Drought Planning and Risk Assessment: Status 
and Future Directions, 39 ANNALS ARID ZONE 211, 213–14 (2000) (singling out New Mexico, 
Utah, Nebraska, Texas, and Georgia as increasing their focus on mitigation and prevention). 
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vary due to differences in climate, hydrology, economics, population, 
and other variables.128 However, certain guiding principles might help 
states determine appropriate policies to reduce vulnerability while still 
providing drought relief. 
Few state statutes pay careful attention to the issue of drought 
definition.129 Under many state statutes, the Governor, other state 
officials or agencies, or interstate bodies have authority to declare 
drought on an ad hoc basis, with either vague or nonexistent statutory 
criteria defining the conditions under which drought relief is 
appropriate.130 Some states define drought by statute or regulation, but 
without sufficient specificity to provide a clear signal to water users or 
to reflect a considered policy judgment about when responses are 
appropriate.131 Other states are more specific in defining drought. 
Kansas requires water providers to develop adequate water supplies to 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See Margaret S. Hrezo et al., Integrating Drought Planning into Water Resources 
Management, 26 NAT. RESOURCES J. 141, 167 (1986) (arguing that both the content and the 
feasibility of state drought responses vary due to a range of physical and political factors). 
 129. See supra Section I.B (addressing the various definitions of “drought”). 
 130. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-192 (2011) (authorizing Arizona Governor to 
declare an emergency due to weather conditions, implicitly including drought, and noting 
drought emergencies declared in 1989, 1998, and 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2104 
(West  2010) (authorizing the Colorado Governor to suspend laws and create new laws during 
declared disasters, including drought); IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.266(1) (West 2004) 
(authorizing the Iowa Governor to proclaim disaster emergency “due to a drought or other event 
affecting water resources of the state”); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3102 (West 2009)  
(providing for “drought or other water resource shortage declared by proclamation of the 
Governor”); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82A-408 (1997) (authorizing Kansas Board of County 
Commissioners to declare drought emergencies); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-16 (West 1990) (the 
Delaware River Basin Compact, which authorizes a commission to declare drought emergency 
with the consent of all parties); 4 PA. Code § 119.1 (2011) (allowing the Governor to designate 
any area of the Commonwealth as being in a drought); 32 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 820.1 11.4(a) 
(West 1997) (authorizing the Susquehanna River Basin Commission to declare a drought 
emergency); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-166-010 (2011) (authorizing the Washington 
Department of Ecology to declare a drought emergency). 
 131. See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:19-1.3 (2011) (defining drought as “a condition of 
dryness due to lower than normal precipitation, resulting in reduced stream flows, reduced soil 
moisture and/or a lowering of the potentiometric surface in wells”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20 
(McKinney 2011) (delineating disasters, including droughts, as “occurrence or imminent threat 
of wide spread or severe damage, injury, or loss of life or property resulting from any natural or 
man-made causes”); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9 § 5.116(I) (2011) (providing for a 
sequence of “drought watch,” “drought warning,” “drought emergency,” and “drought disaster” 
based on a drought-forecasting plan tied to “indicators such as precipitation deficits, surface and 
ground water levels, reservoir storage and soil moisture”); 4 PA. CODE § 112.3 (2011) (defining 
natural disasters as including drought and other catastrophes that result “in damage to property, 
hardship, suffering or possible loss of life”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.014 (West 2005) 
(authorizing the Texas Governor to declare a drought disaster, but not specifying qualifying 
conditions for drought). 
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meet needs during a drought with a 2% probability of occurrence.132 
Although experts might quibble with technical aspects of this definition, 
and although it might have to be reevaluated if conditions change due to 
climate disruption, it provides at least some signal regarding the 
probability and severity of conditions considered to constitute drought. 
However, even this definition is designed for water resources 
management planning, not necessarily to trigger financial or other 
drought relief. 
The absence or vagueness of statutory or regulatory triggers for 
drought relief and response has some advantages because it provides 
flexibility to address a range of different drought timing and conditions. 
For example, a short, intense period of low precipitation might warrant 
different responses than a longer, less severe reduction in precipitation. 
However, leaving the declaration of drought entirely to the discretion of 
the Governor or other state officials on an ad hoc basis can cause 
important decisions about when to provide drought relief or to trigger 
conservation or mitigation requirements to be based on political 
considerations, rather than on a policy determination of what will result 
in the most appropriate balance between short-term drought relief and 
long-term risk reduction. 
It would be preferable for state statutes or regulations to establish 
explicit standards dictating when drought relief or response measures 
are appropriate. Such standards would signal water users about the 
conditions under which the state will provide relief, thus encouraging 
prevention-oriented risk decisions. Stricter triggers for relief will place 
users at greater risk of loss, but will encourage sustainable practices to 
reduce vulnerability. For example, states might borrow from policies 
adopted in Australia in 1992 to encourage agricultural practices 
appropriate to regional climate and hydrology.133 Drought legislation 
could require farmers and other water users to plan for the “normal” 
range of meteorological conditions rather than provide relief whenever 
                                                                                                                     
 132. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-928 (1997) (municipal water supplies), 82a-1303 (state 
conservation storage supply). Likewise, private water rights applicants must prove capacity for 
beneficial use during a drought with a two percent probability of occurrence. Id. § 82a-1304. 
The statutory standard is specified by regulation as a drought having a statistical chance of 
occurring once every fifty years, on average, which the state assumes is equivalent to conditions 
measured in the drought record from 1952–1957. See KAN. ADMIN. REGS. §§ 98-5-1, 98-5-8 
(2011). 
 133. Australia decided that providing relief under what might be referred to as conditions 
of “normal” aridity in a given region encouraged unsustainable farming practices and that relief 
should be provided only for conditions that a prudent farmer could not have reasonably 
predicted. The policy was modified over time in response to later droughts to provide relief 
payments in “exceptional circumstances,” a standard that proved difficult and somewhat 
arbitrary to administer absent more precise criteria. See Wilhite et al., supra note 64, at 142–45; 
PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at 5, 24. 
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precipitation falls below “average.” Legislators or other decisionmakers 
would have to make tough decisions about what range within the 
regional precipitation probability curve should define extraordinary 
conditions beyond which prudent businesses should be expected to plan. 
If precipitation patterns shift as much as predicted due to climate 
change, making those decisions will become increasingly complex. 
Moreover, to effectuate the desired policy goal, state legislatures and 
regulatory officials need to exercise restraint in the face of specific 
drought emergencies. Further, these decisionmakers should avoid 
pressure from affected interest groups to provide ad hoc financial or 
regulatory relief that minimizes the effectiveness of the intended 
incentives. 
A second centerpiece of many state drought statutes is funding for 
drought relief. Although state drought relief funding is miniscule 
compared to the massive amount of federal drought relief,134 it is the 
most obvious example of programs for which the balance between 
compassion and risk is particularly challenging. Many states provide for 
open-ended or vaguely defined financial relief to various categories of 
drought victims,135 sometimes through tax or regulatory relief,136 or 
relief from private sector economic consequences137 rather than direct 
payments. Other states, however, fund projects designed to prevent or 
reduce drought impacts.138 Unconditioned, easily triggered financial 
relief is more likely to reduce drought impacts to individuals and 
businesses, but provides few incentives to reduce vulnerability. Either 
                                                                                                                     
 134. See infra Subsection II.B.2; PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra 
note 23, at 12, 18. 
 135. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN, § 24-32-2106 (West 2010) (granting general funding 
for community disaster recovery, including for droughts); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-702 
(LexisNexis 2010) (funding to alleviate adverse impacts of regulatory decisions necessary to 
protect water resources); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 418.073 (West 2005) (providing funds from 
disaster contingency fund if the Governor determines that the demands placed on funding 
normally appropriated to local and state agencies are excessively great for coping with a specific 
emergency); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.83B.415, 43.83B.430 (West 2007) (providing for 
grants and loans for members of the agricultural community suffering from drought). 
 136. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.5 (West 2011) (tax relief for involuntary livestock 
sales due to drought); KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 5-7-1 (2011) (relief from nonuse or forfeiture 
provision of state water law where water is not available due to drought); TEX. AGRIC. CODE 
ANN. §§ 161.054, 163.066 (West 2004) (variance from restrictions on livestock movement). 
 137. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 570.4 (West 1992) (limitations on crop liens); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 654.15 (West 2011) (deferral of foreclosure caused by drought). 
 138. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-60-121, 37-60-123.5 (West 2010) (funding for 
water conservation and stream flow restoration projects, and loans or grants to fund water 
augmentation projects for agrarians suffering from effects of declared droughts); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 19-3001, 19-3002 (2007) (allowing Kansas counties to spend funds for drought relief 
wells and other emergency water supply projects); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-166-010, 173-
166-090 (2011) (providing funding for projects designed to “alleviate drought conditions 
relating to agricultural and fisheries survival”). 
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stingier financial relief programs, stricter (or at least clearer) definitions 
of drought to trigger relief, or programs conditioned on advance 
prevention and mitigation are more likely to promote drought risk 
reduction. Likewise, spending money to augment water supplies or 
otherwise to reduce drought severity once drought begins is likely to 
reduce human and economic suffering, but predrought investments to 
reduce water demand are more likely to reduce long-term vulnerability. 
There has been some trend toward increased use of mitigation in 
state drought plans.139 One mitigation strategy is temporary reallocation 
of water rights or suspension or limitation of withdrawal privileges 
during drought. Some states, for example, restrict or prohibit water 
withdrawals during declared droughts.140 Others move in the opposite 
direction by authorizing emergency withdrawal permits or alternative 
supply sources to augment supplies during drought,141 and some 
increase the flexibility of water users to engage in willing transfers of 
water rights during droughts.142 States also vary in their philosophies 
about whether drought-related shortages should be borne equally among 
users or should reflect policy-based use priorities. Texas, for example, 
requires pro rata reductions during drought—that is, no preference 
among users.143 Iowa, by contrast, provides a statutory hierarchy for 
allocating water during drought, enforced through sequential 
prohibitions on water uses by category,144 while Pennsylvania has the 
authority to prohibit nonessential water use during droughts.145 
The choice among different approaches to modifying water rights 
reflects competing policy goals, but with implications for the resulting 
balance between compassion and risk. For example, provisions that 
facilitate water transfers provide incentives to use water more efficiently 
                                                                                                                     
 139. See Najarian, supra note 121, at 68–71 (but noting inadequate knowledge of plan 
implementation). 
 140. See, e.g., TEX. SPEC. DISTS. CODE ANN. § 8802.109 (2010). But see id. § 8802.110 
(banning all groundwater uses during extreme droughts, but providing exception for human 
consumption to protect health, welfare, and safety). 
 141. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-408 (1997); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 173-166-010(2), 
173-166-070 (2011). 
 142. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-83-104 to -106 (West 2004); WASH. ADMIN. CODE 
§§ 173-166-010(2)(b), 173-166-080 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.83B.410 (West 2007). 
 143. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.039 (West 2008). 
 144. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.266(1)(c) (West 2004). Restrictions may be imposed in 
sequence to: (1) interstate water transfers; (2) water for primarily recreational activities; (3) 
irrigation water for commodity crops such as “hay, corn, soybeans, oats, grain, sorghum[,] or 
wheat;” (4) water for manufacturing or industrial use; (5) water used to generate electricity; (6) 
water for livestock production; and (7) water for various sources of human consumption. Id. 
§ 455B.266(2). 
 145. See 4 PA. CODE § 119.4 (2011) (prohibiting uses such as watering outdoor 
landscaping, washing paved surfaces or equipment, filling swimming pools, and any other 
“nonessential” use). 
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to free up a salable commodity, while simultaneously allocating water 
more efficiently in times of scarcity. A drought-neutral approach in 
which shortages are borne pro rata operates like the traditional riparian 
rights system,146 in which users presumably have an incentive to 
conserve if sufficient supplies remain to support uses, but with 
considerable uncertainty depending on the length and severity of the 
resulting cutbacks. Use-based reductions operate like the seniority 
approach in the prior appropriation system.147 High priority users have 
few incentives to save because they will get their share under all but the 
most severe conditions, and low priority users have little incentive to 
save because their uses are likely to be eliminated first. Unlike the prior 
appropriation system, however, use priorities based on legislative 
judgments at least reflect a policy judgment as to which water uses are 
most important during drought. 
A second common mitigation strategy is to require or encourage 
water suppliers and users to prepare and implement drought emergency 
plans or water conservation plans as a condition of state water rights or 
water use permits.148 To some extent, such strategies shift key decisions 
about balancing relief and risk reduction “downstream” to water 
providers and users, and the nature of that balance may depend on the 
strategies chosen. States may require water users and providers to 
identify or implement water conservation or other use reduction 
methods,149 or to plan for alternative or augmented water supplies.150 
Such strategies are inherently designed to reduce drought 
vulnerability.151  
                                                                                                                     
 146. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text. 
 148. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-342(A), 45-342(I) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 37-60-126(2)(a) (West 2010)  (requiring covered entities to create, publicize, and implement a 
plan by which to encourage customers to use water efficiently, and allowing other state or local 
government entities to develop and use such plans); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733(a) (1997) 
(authorizing the chief engineer to require water user permits to include conservation plans and 
practices when they will “promote public interest”); N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 7:19-2.14(a)(10), 
7:19-6.5(a)(3), 7:19-7.3(b)(3) (2011); 4 PA. CODE §§ 118.4(a)(1), 118.5(a) (2011); TEX. WATER 
CODE ANN. § 36.113(c)(7) (West 2008) (allowing districts to require that a drought contingency 
plan be included in the permit or permit amendment application for a well); TEX. WATER CODE 
ANN. § 11.1272(a) (West 2008) (requiring public water suppliers and irrigation districts to have 
drought contingency plans consistent with regional water policies); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§ 21.0121 (West 2004) (requiring drought contingency plan in water rights application).  
 149. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-716, 46-708 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 7:19-6.5 (2011); 4 PA. CODE § 120.4 (2011); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.1272 (West 2008). 
 150. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-342(I)(3) (2010); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:19-
11.2(a)(1)(i) (2011). 
 151. States also use a menagerie of other mitigation strategies. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 37-60-126.5 (West 2010) (drought mitigation planning); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-32-2105 
(West 2008) (creating the Department of Emergency Management, which is responsible for 
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B.  Federal Law and Policy 
1.  Federal Water Law and Policy 
Because water resources allocation in the United States is left largely 
to the states,152 there is no single, coherent body of federal water law. 
There is, however, a long history of federal investment and water 
project construction that drives water resources development, especially 
in the West and the Midwest. In addition, various sources of federal law 
govern water rights and allocation for particular parties or in specific 
geographic locations. Although none of those sources of federal water 
law is directed at drought per se, some have drought-specific provisions, 
and each has varying degrees of influence on the balance between 
compassion and risk in federal, state, and private drought response. 
a.  Federal Water Resource Development 
Through laws such as the Reclamation Act of 1902153 and the Water 
Resources Development Act,154 the federal government has supported a 
massive system of dams and other water projects built and operated by 
the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and 
regional entities such as the Bonneville Power Authority and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. Through the Federal Power Act of 1920,155 
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission licenses a similarly 
significant set of non-federal water projects.156 
                                                                                                                     
preparing and maintaining a state disaster plan); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-105(2)(a) 
(West 2005); id. § 18-13-109(2)(a) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-1414(b) (1997) 
(relaxation of weather modification regulations); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:19-9.3(a) (2011) (water 
surcharges); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1109(b) (West 2008); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1451 (West 
2003); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.509(a) (West 2008) (temporary allowance of otherwise 
unlawful waste discharges to augment stream flows); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 352.081(c) 
(West 2005) (permitting the prohibition or restriction of outdoor burning); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 43.83B.405 (West 2007) (public communication and education regarding drought 
conditions).  
 152. See supra Section II.A (outlining what modifications to state water law are warranted 
as a means of adaption to drought). In the eastern United States, where there is little federal 
land, states have always governed water rights and allocation through the common law and later 
statutory and regulatory versions of the riparian rights doctrine. See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., 
LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, CASES AND MATERIALS 27 (4th ed. 2006). In the West, 
the Supreme Court recognized, through a confusing evolution of cases, that Congress severed 
water rights from federal land holdings through statutes such as the Mining Act of 1866, leaving 
water rights to allocation under state law. See id. at 331–35; Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver 
Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 162 (1935).   
 153. Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1903) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
43 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 154. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2201–22 (2006). 
 155. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791–823d (2006). 
 156. See Adler, supra note 97, at 1019–23. 
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Statutes governing federal water project construction or licensing do 
not establish federal drought policy per se. At most, they articulate 
general principles of water resource management,157 with delegation of 
authority over project management to federal program officials. 
Moreover, Congress has consistently subjected implementation of those 
federal laws to applicable state water law,158 except where state law 
conflicts with an express requirement of the federal statute.159 In that 
sense, federal water resource development statutes could be viewed as 
drought-neutral: the federal role is simply to provide or facilitate water 
infrastructure, with key decisions about water and drought left to state 
law. 
However, federal decisions about project funding, approval, and 
operation can significantly influence drought management and impacts. 
Federally built or licensed water projects provide significant storage 
capacity that helps buffer regions from the effects of meteorological 
drought, thus reducing vulnerability. On the other hand, that 
infrastructure arguably stimulates water use in regions with limited 
water supply, particularly when federal subsidies distort decisions about 
the economic benefits and risks of water use.160 Irrigation confers 
significant benefits in terms of food production,161 and water storage 
and conveyance support urban growth and development in regions 
where many people want to live.162 However, artificially high water use 
can increase vulnerability if reservoir storage runs short during a 
protracted drought, especially if climate disruption reduces precipitation 
beyond the range assumed when projects were built, for example, in the 
Colorado River Basin.163 Decisions about additional storage capacity to 
                                                                                                                     
 157. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 390b, 411, 485h (2006) (providing for use of Reclamation Act 
project water for utilitarian uses, such as irrigation, municipal and industrial water supply, 
electric power, navigation, and flood control); id. § 372 (providing for beneficial use as the 
“basis, the measure, and the limit” to the right to Reclamation Act project water); 16 U.S.C. 
§ 803(a) (2006) (providing for Federal Power Act licensing of water projects that are “best 
adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway”). 
 158. See Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2006); Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 821 
(2006). 
 159. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 647, 675–79 (1978) (upholding state 
conditions if consistent with provisions in federal act). But see First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. 
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 328 U.S. 152, 170–71 (1946) (holding that state water permit is not 
needed as prerequisite to Federal Power Act license, so long as water is returned to stream 
without harmful diminution). 
 160. See generally RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989) (discussing the inefficient use of 
federal water use subsidies); Mark Kanazawa, Pricing Subsidies and Economic Efficiency: The 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 36 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1993) (same). 
 161. See PEREIRA ET AL., supra note 7, at 18 (noting that irrigated agriculture consumes 
about one-sixth of all arable land but produces 40% of the world’s crops). 
 162. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 88, at 5. 
 163. See Martin Hoerling & Jon Eischeid, Past Peak Water in the Southwest, SW. 
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deal with future drought will either be made by federal agencies, or will 
be subject to federal licensing or permitting.164 Moreover, the federal 
role does not end once water projects are built. Despite the fact that 
federal water project operation is typically subject to state water law and 
therefore requires acquisition of state water rights,165 federal officials 
make key decisions about use and allocation of federal project water,166 
including during droughts.167 
Federal decisions regarding water project construction and operation 
are also subject to federal environmental statutes, which may also play a 
role in drought policy. For example, federal decisions about dam 
construction, operation, and management may be subject to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).168 If an environmental impact 
statement (EIS) is required, the agency must study and reveal 
reasonably foreseeable environmental project impacts, alternatives to 
the action and comparative impacts, and potential mitigation.169 The 
Endangered Species Act (ESA)170 may have an even greater impact on 
drought response where Section 7 consultation171 requires water from 
                                                                                                                     
HYDROLOGY, Jan.–Feb. 2007, at 18; N. Christensen & D.P. Lettenmaier, A Multimodel 
Ensemble Approach to Assessment of Climate Change Impacts on the Hydrology of the 
Colorado River Basin, 3 HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCI. DISCUSSIONS 3727, 3748–49 (2006); 
Gregory J. McCabe & David M. Wolock, Warming May Create Substantial Water Supply 
Shortages in the Colorado River Basin, GEOPHYSICAL RESEARCH LETTERS (Nov. 27, 2007), at 1, 
3–4, available at http://www.agu.org/pubs/crossref/2007/2007GL031764.shtml; Richard Seager 
et al., Model Projections of an Imminent Transition to a More Arid Climate in Southwestern 
North America, 316 SCIENCE 1181, 1181–84 (2007). 
 164. See James City Cnty., Va. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330, 1331–32, 1339 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(upholding EPA veto of county water supply project on environmental grounds); Adler, supra 
note 17, at 55–57. 
 165. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 166. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Hudson, 731 F. Supp. 1261, 1263–64, 1273 (E.D.N.C. 
1990) (reviewing Army Corps of Engineers’ decision to allow pipeline diverting water from 
Corps reservoir for municipal water supply). 
 167. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 2212 (2006) (authorizing temporary water supplies from federal 
reclamation projects to alleviate water shortages during drought, free from regular ownership, 
acreage, or pricing restrictions of Reclamation Act); South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 
1014, 1019 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding Army Corps of Engineers’ decisions regarding reservoir 
releases during period of drought). 
 168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70f (2006). NEPA is almost invariably triggered by federal 
decisions regarding water project construction, funding, licensing, or permitting. See SAX ET AL., 
supra note 152, at 668 (commenting that virtually all federal water projects will constitute major 
federal action subject to NEPA). 
 169. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (discussing the situations in which an 
EIS is necessary); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.12–1502.16 (2010) (setting forth EIS requirements). 
 170. 16 U.S.C. § 1531–1544 (2006). 
 171. See id. § 1536 (requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior 
(or the Secretary of Commerce for marine species) to ensure that federal action does not 
jeopardize the continued existence of any listed threatened or endangered species, or destroy or 
adversely modify habitat critical to the support of those species). ESA consultation requirements 
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federal projects to be devoted to species and habitat protection rather 
than irrigation, municipal or industrial water supply, or other off stream 
human uses during drought.172 
Because federal water project decisions are subject to discretion by 
different agencies within highly variable contexts, it is difficult to 
discern a uniform “policy” as to how they affect drought management. 
However, both NEPA and the ESA require agencies to evaluate 
alternatives that might minimize impacts on the environment or on 
threatened or endangered species and their habitat.173 That analysis 
provides the informational framework and legal support for agencies to 
choose between competing drought management strategies and goals. 
Stored federal project water might be used to provide drought relief to 
users who might otherwise have to curtail their uses and activities, 
potentially encouraging inefficiency in the long run. Alternatively, 
agencies might reduce vulnerability by conditioning water availability 
on the implementation of water efficiency measures.174 An oft-
overlooked requirement of NEPA is that agencies must consider “the 
relationship between local short-term uses of man’s environment and 
the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.”175 An 
approach that exalts short-term uses might focus on immediate drought 
relief, whereas one that focuses more on long-term productivity might 
promote efforts to reduce vulnerability. 
One example is the Bureau of Reclamation’s guidelines governing 
operation of the Glen Canyon and Hoover Dams given current and 
                                                                                                                     
may also be triggered by ongoing operational decisions. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. 
Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125, 1133 (9th Cir. 1998) (requiring ESA consultation for water 
contract renewals); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 
F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233, 1251 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (requiring ESA consultation for annual 
operating plan). 
 172. See Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 
1082, 1084–85, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (invalidating ESA action for insufficient flows for 
endangered fish); Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195–96, 1211 (D. Or. 2001) 
(upholding operating plan as necessary to protect fish); Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and 
Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENVTL. 
L.J. 197, 212–14 (2002) (describing Section 7 duties); Holly Doremus & A. Dan Tarlock, Fish, 
Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279, 283–84 (2003) 
(discussing the closing of the Klamath Project headgates, which halted irrigation deliveries in an 
effort to protect endangered fish). 
 173. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iii) (2006) (requiring agencies to evaluate in an EIS 
alternatives to the proposed action); 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (2010) (same); 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1536(b)(3)(A) (2006) (requiring consideration of “reasonable and prudent alternatives” that 
would not jeopardize species and their habitats). 
 174. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(f) (2010) (requiring an EIS to consider “[n]atural or 
depletable resource requirements and conservation potential of various alternatives and 
mitigation measures”). 
 175. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv) (2006). 
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predicted shortages in the Colorado River Basin.176 Guided by an EIS 
process177 and a negotiated agreement by the Colorado River Basin 
States,178 the “interim” guidelines179 specify reservoir elevations for 
Lake Powell and Lake Mead that dictate prescribed water delivery 
reductions.180 However, the guidelines also encourage water 
conservation and allow storage of the resulting savings in the reservoirs 
free from the “use it or lose it” provisions of prior appropriation.181 Two 
aspects of the guidelines stand out as mechanisms that can motivate risk 
reduction while still providing for some relief in the event of severe 
drought. First, by providing quantitative clarity regarding reservoir 
levels at which specified reductions will occur,182 the guidelines 
establish clear signals by which water users can make decisions about 
water use and efficiency. Second, rather than simply providing free 
water from federal storage in the event of drought, the provisions tie 
drought relief to earlier efforts to generate surplus through conservation 
or augmentation of water supplies.183 
b.  Federal Law Governing Water Rights and Allocation 
There is also no integrated body of federal law governing water 
rights and allocation by which to guide federal drought policy. 
However, several sources of federal law affect water rights in specific 
applications. Those sources include the federal reserved water rights 
doctrine governing Indian reservations and other reserved federal 
lands,184 federal statutes,185 congressionally approved interstate 
                                                                                                                     
 176. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER 
BASIN SHORTAGES AND THE COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD 1, 2 
(2007) [hereinafter COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES], available at 
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf. 
 177. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACT STATEMENT: COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES AND 
COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD, at ES-1 (2007), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/FEIS/index.html (explaining the EIS process 
and guidelines). 
 178. Law of the River, CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT, http://www.cap-az.com/AboutUs/ 
LawOfTheRiver.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (stating that the Basin States signed an 
agreement concerning the Colorado river management and operations on April 23, 2007). 
 179. Although the guidelines are not permanent, they are designed to remain in effect until 
2025 for water supply decisions and 2026 for reservoir operating decisions, a relatively long 
time for such policies. See COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES, supra note 176, 
at 4. 
180. See COLORADO RIVER INTERIM SHORTAGE GUIDELINES, supra note 176, at 33–59. 
 181. The specific mechanism is called “Intentionally Created Surplus.” See id. 
182. Id. at 33–59 (detailing the process for providing drought relief to the Colorado River 
Basin Area). 
 183. See id. at 38–39 (describing categories of ICS). 
 184. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978) (national forests); 
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compacts,186 and Supreme Court decisions and decrees187 governing 
allocation of specific interstate waters.188 By and large, federal law 
either protects federal property or resource interests, or fulfills the 
federal role in resolving interstate water disputes. To the extent that 
these goals are independent of drought policy, this piecemeal body of 
federal water law is drought-neutral. However, given that federal 
intervention into state water allocation decisions has the greatest 
significance during times of scarcity,189 federal water law can affect the 
balance between relief-based and risk-reduction approaches to drought. 
i.  Federal Reserved Water Rights 
The federal reserved water rights doctrine casts a “cloud” over the 
state prior appropriation doctrine,190 with an uncertain impact on the 
manner in which other water users perceive and respond to drought risk. 
Federal reserved water rights consist of water that the federal 
government, pursuant to its authority under the Commerce Clause191 
and the Property Clause,192 impliedly reserved to support the uses for 
which particular federal lands were set aside from the general public 
                                                                                                                     
Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 131, 147 (1976) (national monuments); Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963) (Indian reservations, national recreation areas, national 
forests, and national wildlife refuges); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565–66 (1908) 
(Indian reservations). 
 185. E.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617–17t (2006) (allocating lower 
Colorado River among states in the lower Colorado River Basin, as determined in Arizona v. 
California, 373 U.S. at 564–65). 
 186. E.g., Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 324 (1928), available at 
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-12a-
2 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-61-101 (West 2011); Delaware River Basin 
Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. 
No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).  
 187. E.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 551, 589–90 (1963) (referring to the 
Colorado River); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (referring to the Arkansas River). 
 188. The federal government also plays an obvious role in international water disputes, but 
this analysis is limited to domestic law. 
 189. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 190. See SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 941. The federal reserved water rights doctrine has 
far more impact on prior appropriation states because the vast majority of federal land holdings 
are in the West. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 699 n.3 (1978).  But see Hope 
M. Babcock, Reserved Indian Water Rights in Riparian Jurisdictions: Water, Water 
Everywhere, Perhaps Some Drops for Us, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1203 (2006) (arguing for tribes 
in the East to receive same riparian rights as those in the West); Jeremy N. Jungreis, “Permit” 
Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water Rights of Federal Lands in the 
Regulated Riparian East, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369 (2005) (claiming that consumption in 
the East has also increased as water supplies decrease). 
 191. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 192. Id. art. IV, § 3. 
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domain.193 Because the priority date for federal reserved rights is based 
on the date the reservation was established,194 in many cases those 
rights have priority over other uses under the “first in time, first in 
right” tenet of the prior appropriation doctrine.195 Moreover, federal 
reserved rights are not subject to the “use it or lose it” requirement of 
prior appropriation law.196 Many federal reserved rights have not been 
quantified; they might be quite substantial relative to other uses and 
water rights, or they may not be in actual use or might consist of 
instream uses that are not transparent to other users absent a legal claim 
of priority. 
In theory, uncertainties in federal reserved rights could cause other 
water users to exercise caution about inefficient water use for fear that 
those uses would be reduced or eliminated by senior reserved rights 
during a drought. In reality, however, this potential efficiency incentive 
is counterbalanced by incentives in the prior appropriation doctrine. 
Given the tendency toward complacency during times of plenty, water 
users are more likely to use as much of the resource as they can absent 
an actual challenge. Moreover, because users are subject to statutory 
forfeiture or common law abandonment if they do not use their full 
appropriative rights,197 and because the prohibition against waste is 
enforced ineffectively at best,198 prior appropriation doctrine prevents 
the latent pendency of federal reserved rights from serving as a 
significant incentive for efficiency. This dynamic might shift if the 
federal and state governments improved or expedited efforts to quantify 
federal reserved water rights through general stream adjudications,199 
statutory settlements, or otherwise. Although the “use it or lose it” 
mentality of nonfederal water users would likely persist even in the face 
of quantification when resources are sufficient, at least those users 
would be on notice of the risks they face when supplies diminish during 
drought. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 193. See Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976). 
 194. See id. But see United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding 
that the priority date for Indian reserved right was “time immemorial” based on aboriginal water 
rights). 
 195. See supra notes 112–17 and accompanying text. 
 196. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600, 601 (holding that reserved rights are 
intended to meet both present and future needs). 
 197. See SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 247–64. 
 198. See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
 199. See 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970) (subjecting United States to jurisdiction of state court in 
adjudications of rights to stream systems). For examples of such adjudications, see In re Gen. 
Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, 989 P.2d 739, 
744 (Ariz. 1999); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River 
System, 753 P.2d 76, 84–86 (Wyo. 1988). 
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Federal reserved water rights also provide mixed incentives for risk 
reduction by federal water users. Federal reserved rights are quantified 
relative to the amount of water necessary to fulfill the primary purpose 
of the reservation.200 Quantification based entirely on demand, rather 
than a balancing of supply and demand under a range of hydrological 
circumstances, provides incentives for federal users to overstate their 
needs in order to maximize their quantified water rights. However, the 
Supreme Court has somewhat curtailed this tendency by clarifying that 
the doctrine “reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of the reservation, no more.”201 Nonfederal water users might 
argue that this standard demands that federal users base their claims on 
efficient methods of water use. Ironically, however, it is difficult for 
non-federal users to argue that federal claimants must be more efficient 
than they are. Efforts to reconcile inchoate federal reserved rights with 
existing water rights and uses could force all users to evaluate efficiency 
improvements that might reduce drought vulnerability. 
ii.  Federal Resolution of Interstate Water Disputes 
A range of legal tools is used to resolve interstate water conflicts by 
varying institutions at different times and to address different issues. 
Therefore, these legal tools are not likely to reflect a coherent or 
consistent drought policy. Resolutions are likely to be drought-neutral if 
they simply allocate water among competing users regardless of 
hydrological conditions. However, federal intervention in interstate 
water disputes can provide positive or negative incentives for reducing 
drought vulnerability. 
The law of equitable apportionment, under which the Supreme Court 
resolves interstate water disputes202 absent a compact or other direct 
agreement, has the potential to stimulate efforts to reduce drought 
vulnerability, but the Court’s infrequent and tepid application of this 
doctrine has minimized that potential thus far. In deciding 
apportionment among states, the Court considers, among other factors, 
“the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas.”203 
Moreover, while priority is the “guiding principle” in interstate 
allocation disputes between two prior appropriation states, the Court 
considers other factors, such as available conservation methods and the 
balance of harms between states.204 In theory, judicial inquiry into the 
                                                                                                                     
 200. See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701–02 (1978). 
 201. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). 
 202. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over cases and controversies between 
states. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 518 (1906). 
 203. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945). 
 204. Colorado v. New Mexico (I), 459 U.S. 176, 183–84, 188 (1982) (quoting Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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efficiency of water use by competing states should provide incentives 
for efforts to improve efficiency and hence to reduce drought 
vulnerability. 
Unfortunately, two aspects of the Court’s equitable-apportionment 
jurisprudence have limited the effectiveness of this incentive. First, the 
Court has declined to resolve interstate water disputes absent interstate 
impacts of a “serious magnitude.”205 This tendency reflects, in part, the 
Court’s reluctance to interfere with state control over water resources 
and perhaps an intentional judicial incentive for states to resolve water 
disputes through negotiation rather than litigation. However, the effect 
is to defer key decisions until impacts have already occurred, rather than 
adopting or requiring preventive measures to reduce risk. Second, the 
Court declined to provide relief in Colorado v. New Mexico—the most 
significant equitable-apportionment case in which the Court actually 
examined water efficiency. Overruling findings by a Special Master, the 
Court held that Colorado did not meet a strict “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard to prove inefficient water use in New Mexico.206 
Arguably, the Court simply followed the reluctance of western states to 
curtail traditional existing water uses in determining waste or 
inefficiency. But the Court’s weak scrutiny provides little incentive for 
states to promote sustainable water use and management to reduce 
drought vulnerability for themselves and neighboring states.207 
Interstate water compacts are not likely to reflect a considered 
federal drought policy because, despite requiring congressional 
approval,208 the compacts more likely reflect interstate negotiation than 
federal policy. Congress has no incentive to disturb those judgments 
absent an inappropriate impact on non-signatory states or countervailing 
federal interests.209 
Some interstate water compacts reflect a largely drought-neutral 
approach, that is, they might envision drought and even allocate the risk 
of drought among the party states, but then leave decisions about 
resulting shortages either to individual states within the apportionments 
                                                                                                                     
 205. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 117 (1907) (stating that although Colorado had 
diminished the flow of water into Kansas, Kansas had not made out a case entitling it to a decree 
for relief; such relief could come at a time in the future when an equitable division of benefits no 
longer existed); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 868–71 (noting that the Supreme Court 
has only actually issued apportionment decrees in three cases). 
 206. Colorado v. New Mexico (II), 467 U.S. 310, 312, 316–20 (1984). 
 207. See id. at 333 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion provided 
little incentive for states to improve efficiency of water use and management to accommodate 
uses in neighboring states). 
 208. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 (prohibiting states from entering into compacts “without 
the Consent of Congress”).  
 209. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518–21 (1893) (requiring congressional 
consent when a compact might increase state power at the expense of the federal government). 
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negotiated in the agreement or to future resolution. The Colorado River 
Compact, for example, assigns the risk of drought to the Upper Basin.210 
Although it apportions fixed rights to beneficial consumptive use 
between the Upper and Lower Basins,211 the Compact prohibits the 
states primarily situated in the Upper Basin (or the “Upper Division”212) 
from causing flows at Lee Ferry to fall below levels necessary to meet 
the Lower Basin’s full apportionment on a ten-year rolling average,213 
thus placing any risk of loss on the Upper Basin. This allocation of 
drought risk reflected a quid pro quo, in return for which the Upper 
Division states were freed from enforcement of the prior appropriation 
doctrine given far more rapid growth in the Lower Basin, especially in 
California.214 The potentially perverse result is that the Upper Division 
states would have far greater incentives than the Lower Division states 
to reduce drought vulnerability. On the other hand, the tension created 
within the Compact, and perhaps the aversion to expensive and 
protracted litigation that would be required for the Lower Division to 
enforce its Compact rights against the Upper Division, generated 
sufficient incentives for the states and the federal government to 
negotiate the interim shortage guidelines discussed earlier.215 
Other interstate compacts, notably the Delaware River Basin 
Compact216 and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact,217 address 
drought management more directly but without significant guidance. 
The Delaware Compact establishes the interstate Delaware River Basin 
Commission (DRBC),218 which has authority to allocate basin waters 
                                                                                                                     
 210. The Compact divides the basin between lands draining into the river above and below 
Lee Ferry. The Upper Basin includes portions of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming; the Lower Basin includes portions of Arizona, California, Nevada, New Mexico, and 
Utah. Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. Rec. 324, 325 (1928). 
 211. The Compact apportions 7.5 maf (million acre feet) of beneficial consumptive use 
annually to each basin, plus up to an additional one maf to the lower basin if available from 
lower basin tributaries. Id. at 325; see also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 572–74 
(interpreting the Boulder Canyon Project Act and the Compact as attributing the additional one 
maf to water from lower basin tributaries). 
 212. From a geopolitical and implementation or enforcement perspective, the Compact 
defines the Upper Division states as Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, and the 
Lower Division states as Arizona, California, and Nevada. Colorado River Compact, 70 Cong. 
Rec. 325 (1928). 
 213. Id. 
 214. See ADLER, supra note 88, at 21 (describing California’s growth in light of its water 
rights). 
 215. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text.  
 216. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688, 700 (1961) 
(codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D (2011)); 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 815.101 (2011). 
 217. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, 32 PA. STAT. ANN. § 820.1 (2011). 
 218. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-7 (2011). 
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equitably and proportionally219 and unusually broad authority over basin 
water management generally.220 As part of this authority, the 
Commission has the power to declare drought emergencies and 
accompanying increases or decreases in water allocations, diversions, or 
releases as necessary to address drought conditions.221 However, aside 
from public hearing requirements,222 the Compact provides no 
definition of what constitutes a drought or requirements regarding how 
the Commission’s drought emergency powers should be exercised. 
Some commentators argue that this bare bones approach is the 
Compact’s strength because of its “flexible, cooperative, planning-
oriented structure,”223 while others suggest that the approach is designed 
to leave drought management largely to member states “as long as the 
state agency acts consistently with commission drought management 
plans.”224 An alternative view is that the states entrusted drought and 
water management decisions to the Commission because its 
composition fully represents and protects each state’s interests,225 
although the process has seen controversy and threats of litigation.226 
Regardless of the explanation, the Commission has adopted risk 
reduction strategies for drought in two key respects. First, the 
Commission has defined the “drought of record” to provide notice about 
what will trigger a drought emergency and what should be used for 
dependable water supply planning,227 as well as phased reductions tied 
to particular conditions and geographic areas, and accompanying 
priorities for use reductions.228 Second, to reduce drought vulnerability 
                                                                                                                     
 219. See id. § 32:11D-16. 
 220. See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States 
and the Struggle Over the Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 844 (2005) (stating that the 
Compact confers an unusually expansive water management authority to the Delaware River 
Basin Commission); see also SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 854 (describing Delaware River 
Basin Commission as “one of the most powerful regional agencies ever created,” with “broad 
powers to control all water uses in the basin”). 
 221. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-16 (2011). 
 222. See id. § 32:11D-54. 
 223. Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road Map for States, 12 SOUTHEASTERN 
ENVTL. L.J. 115, 134 (2004). 
 224. Steven T. Miano & Michael T. Crane, Eastern Water Law: Historical Perspectives 
and Emerging Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 14, 18 (2003). 
 225. The Commission includes one representative from each of the four basin states and 
one U.S. commissioner appointed by the President. Delaware River Basin Compact, N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 32:11D-8. A majority vote is needed to change water allocation, ensuring that all states 
are protected fully under drought and other conditions. Id. § 32:11D-11.  
 226. See SAX ET AL., supra note 152, at 854–55 (describing actions by New York to defy 
Supreme Court decree during 1960s drought and Pennsylvania threat of renewed Supreme Court 
litigation during early 1980s drought). 
 227. The Commission identified the drought of record by reference to the 1961–67 
drought. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21 §§ 890.85–90.86 (2011). 
 228. See id. §§ 890.8–90.12. 
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in advance, the Commission requires water users to maximize 
efficiency and to adopt and implement water conservation and 
contingency plans in order to further reduce freshwater use during 
droughts.229 
The comprehensive, interstate commission approach to water 
management in the Delaware and Susquehanna River Basin Compacts 
reflects a rare application of regional, watershed-based river and water 
management that was advocated for many years in the United States and 
manifested most clearly in the Water Resources Planning Act of 
1965,230 but that has been abandoned as a nationwide initiative.231 The 
Delaware River Basin experience and the Colorado River drought 
shortage guidelines suggest that cooperative approaches to resolving 
interstate water disputes provide opportunities to reduce drought 
vulnerability through advance planning and management. By 
comparison, resolving disputes through litigation or otherwise, once 
drought has already occurred, is likely to generate reactive rather than 
preventive drought policies. It would be wise to develop similar 
comprehensive commissions like those established by the Compacts in 
other parts of the country that are likely to face increased drought risk 
due to climate disruption. 
2.  Federal Drought and Agricultural Law and Policy 
Just as states have adopted drought legislation to augment state water 
law, the federal government has adopted drought laws and policies 
independent of or integrated into federal water law and policy only to a 
limited degree. Conversely, federal drought law and policy is linked 
very closely to U.S. agricultural law and policy. Therefore, the manner 
in which the federal government has addressed tradeoffs between 
drought relief and risk reduction can best be understood in the context 
of the historical co-evolution of federal drought and agricultural law. 
a.  Federal Laissez-Faire Policy Before the New Deal 
Until the 1930s, drought and other disaster relief was left largely to 
nongovernmental organizations; those who made unsound risk decisions 
that could not be remedied through the private market went bankrupt 
and moved to other places in search of new livelihoods.232 In 1887, 
President Grover Cleveland vetoed federal legislation appropriating 
$10,000 to provide seeds to drought-stricken Texas as unconstitutional, 
asserting: “Though the people support the government, the government 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See id. §§ 833.5-A(a), 890.4 
 230. Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79 Stat. 244 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962). 
 231. See Adler, supra note 97, at 1012–13 (noting that the Act was defunded in the 1980s). 
 232. See THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 2–6.  
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should not support the people.”233 Under this laissez-faire philosophy, 
only farmers who made sound risk decisions (as to what crops to plant, 
when, and where, and how much to borrow for mortgages, equipment, 
and supplies) continued to operate. However, this approach resulted in 
significant human suffering and economic dislocation, due to extremely 
high bankruptcy and foreclosure rates in the Great Plains and 
elsewhere.234 Farmers who settled areas with unpredictable weather 
took enormous risks to feed and clothe the nation but also bore the full 
consequences of those risks when the weather and economy turned 
bad.235 
The first significant federal drought relief came during World War I, 
but remained focused on self-sufficiency. During 1918 and 1919, 
President Woodrow Wilson authorized $5 million per year for seed 
loans to farmers who lost two successive crops to drought and winter 
frosts.236 Although farm organizations sought more significant federal 
assistance during the 1920s, legislation either failed in Congress or was 
vetoed.237 President Herbert Hoover first sought relief from private 
organizations,238 and in 1930, he approved federal aid of a “self-help” 
variety, such as crop production and feed-and-seed loans secured only 
                                                                                                                     
 233. Id. at 4; H.W. BRANDS, TRAITOR TO HIS CLASS: THE PRIVILEGED LIFE AND RADICAL 
PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 237 (2008); LOWELL K. DYSON, HISTORY OF 
FEDERAL DROUGHT RELIEF PROGRAMS 1 (1988). The Texas Legislature, however, appropriated 
$100,000 that year for drought relief in the form of food and seed grain. See THE HISTORY OF 
DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 4. Other states, such as Kansas and Nebraska, also spent 
small amounts on drought relief during this period, but the Governor of Colorado vetoed 
drought relief in 1894. See id. Of course, at least since the Reclamation Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 
57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.), the U.S. 
government has provided subsidized water for irrigation and other uses, but to promote 
development rather than relieve drought. See supra note 160; Adler, supra note 97, at 1015–19 
(discussing the Reclamation Act of 1902); U.S. CONGRESS, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW 
FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER 11 (2006) [hereinafter HOW FEDERAL 
POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER] (calculating the magnitude of federal water 
subsidies). Of course, additional storage capacity can help buffer the effects of drought, 
especially in arid regions. See GLEICK & NASH, supra note 21, at 5.  
 234. See supra Subsection I.C.1. 
 235. Id. 
 236. See DYSON, supra note 233, at 1. The federal government authorized similarly modest 
amounts for regional drought relief through the early 1920s. See id. (describing appropriations 
for seed loans to farmers in the west). 
 237. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, AGRICULTURE 
INFORMATION BULLETIN NO. 485: HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT 
PROGRAMS, 1933–84, at 1–3 (1984) [hereinafter HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND 
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS]. 
 238. Even the Red Cross had to amend its charter to provide drought relief. Previously, the 
Red Cross could only respond to an “Act of God,” which it did not define to include drought. 
See THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 5. 
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by a first lien on the crops produced.239 Although the Secretary of 
Agriculture had sole discretion to determine when drought relief was 
warranted, funding was so low that farmer risk decisions could be 
subsidized only in extreme situations. Moreover, the 1930 Act provided 
loans, rather than grants or relief payments. While helpful to farmers 
who lacked sufficient capital reserves when revenues from drought-
stricken crops fell, repayment requirements still required farmers to 
internalize the risk of planting a new crop if drought conditions 
remained. However, the federal government subsidized those risk 
decisions by limiting the required loan security to a first lien on the 
crops grown. Drought exacerbated but was not the only source of 
volatility in production and prices in an inherently risky sector of the 
economy. Perhaps as a result, the “‘self-help’ approach used by the 
Hoover administration represents the last attempt by a U.S. [P]resident 
to address drought relief problems through voluntary measures.”240 
b.  The New Deal Legacy of Compassion and Risk-Spreading 
As the drought and depression intensified, and prompted by the 
substantially different philosophy of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Administration, the United States abandoned its laissez-faire approach 
to drought. Instead, the federal government distributed the risk of 
drought across society through programs designed to provide 
emergency response and relief.241 Those measures included government 
funding or other assistance for supplemental water supply, subsidized 
feed or other agricultural inputs, subsidized crop insurance, and direct 
relief payments.242 
New Deal agricultural policies also responded to underlying 
problems in agricultural markets, which were exacerbated but not 
caused by drought. During World War I, the government encouraged 
farmers to produce as much as possible to meet international market 
demand generated by reduced production in war-torn regions.243 When 
those markets declined after the war, U.S. farmers continued to produce 
in record quantities, resulting in surpluses, plummeting market prices, 
                                                                                                                     
 239. See S.J. Res. 211, 71st Cong. (1930) (authorizing $45 million for loans to farmers in 
areas affected by drought, storms, or hail, upon a finding of emergency conditions by the 
Secretary of Agriculture, to purchase seed, fertilizer, feed, or fuel necessary to continue crop 
production); THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 5–6. 
 240. THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 6; DYSON, supra note 233, at 
2 (commenting that drought relief programs were almost always “inextricably mixed” with 
programs for political reform and overall economic recovery). 
 241. See THE HISTORY OF DROUGHT RESPONSE, supra note 76, at 4, 7–20. 
 242. See id. 
 243. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 109–11; THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra 
note 11, at 41. 
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and insufficient farm revenues to meet debt service and other needs.244 
The main purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933245 was to 
restore balance between agricultural supply and demand, and to 
establish sufficient prices to reinstate the purchasing power of producers 
of agricultural commodities246 relative to a base period immediately 
prior to World War I.247 To balance supply and demand, the federal 
government paid farmers to produce less and used proceeds from 
commodity processing taxes to maintain prices and to purchase surplus 
commodities in order to control supply.248 This reduced incentives for 
debt-laden farmers to till more acreage, potentially on marginal soils, to 
maximize revenue despite unfavorable conditions.249 However, guaranteed 
federal payments also reduced the incentive for farmers to reevaluate 
the risk of continuing production in drought-stricken regions. 
Congress did not originally intend for this unprecedented federal 
intervention into agricultural markets to continue beyond the Great 
Depression.250 But as the drought of the 1930s intensified,251 leading to 
                                                                                                                     
 244. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 122–26; HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT 
AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 1. 
 245. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (1933) 
[hereinafter 1933 Act]. Portions of this legislation were declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936), but were largely replaced by 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).  
 246. The 1933 Act defined “basic agricultural commodity” to include wheat, cotton, field 
corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk and milk products. 1933 Act, § 11. In 1934, Congress added 
beef and dairy cattle, peanuts, rye, flax, barley, and grain sorghums. Pub. L. No. 73-142, 48 Stat. 
528 (1934). 
 247. 1933 Act, § 2(1). The base period was defined as August 1909 to July 1914 for all 
crops except tobacco, and the decade immediately following the war (August 1919 to July 1929) 
for tobacco. Id. This concept later became known as “parity,” and the base period against which 
commodity prices are measured remains essentially the same today. 7 U.S.C. § 1301 (2011) 
(baseline period for parity calculation of January 1910 to December 1914 for everything but 
tobacco and a baseline period of August 1919 to July 1929 for tobacco); see HISTORY OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 3. 
 248. 1933 Act, § 8(1). The Act provided for similar agreements with processors, handlers, 
and others involved in the marketing or distribution of agricultural commodities. Id. § 8(2). The 
core provisions of the 1933 Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into production 
agreements in which the federal government would make “rental or benefit payments” to 
commodity producers in return for their agreement to reduce acreage planted, production, or 
both, and accompanying authority to levy (or rebate) processing taxes on the first level of 
commodity processing, tied to amounts determined to match the market price for the commodity 
to the purchasing power for that commodity during the (Pre-World War I) parity period. Id. 
§§ 8–9. 
 249. Voluntary efforts by farm organizations to control production in order to stabilize 
prices has been unsuccessful since the 1920s. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT 
AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 1. 
 250. The 1933 Act included a sunset provision triggered “whenever the President finds and 
proclaims that the national economic emergency in relation to agriculture has been ended . . . .” 
1933 Act, § 13. 
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the intense human suffering of the Dust Bowl,252 Congress continued to 
respond with massive emergency funding for disaster loans and other 
relief programs.253 Following the 1936 Supreme Court decision in 
United States v. Butler, which invalidated the tax provisions of the 1933 
Act,254 Congress modified its intervention into the agricultural economy 
in the Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936.255 The 
1936 Act established a precedent for using agricultural law to protect 
soil, water, and other environmental resources while also continuing 
efforts to control excess production by removing acreage from 
production.256 Unlike its initial, temporary intervention into the 
agricultural economy, however, Congress established long-term 
institutions to implement the 1936 Act257 and linked the soil 
conservation program to the Agricultural Adjustment Act.258 Moreover, 
the soil conservation law directed the Secretary of Agriculture to 
expand domestic and foreign markets and to dispose of surplus 
commodities.259 These linkages made it difficult to decouple federal 
agricultural and conservation policy. 
The Soil Conservation Act failed to curtail production sufficiently to 
maintain prices,260 leading Congress to pass the Agricultural 
                                                                                                                     
 251. “In 1934 . . . 1,457 counties in every State west of the Mississippi, except 
Washington, plus Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan, were designated as drought-
stricken.” DYSON, supra note 233, at 2; see also DROUGHT OF 1936, supra note 11 (describing 
extent and severity of drought from 1930–36). 
 252. See generally JOHNSON, supra note 11 (detailing the plight of the farmer during the 
Dust Bowl); THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT PLAINS, supra note 11 (same).  
 253. See, e.g., Emergency Appropriations Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-412, 48 Stat. 1021, 
1056 (1934) (appropriating $525 million for emergency loans to farmers for seed, feed, freight, 
fallowing and similar purposes). Congress also expanded the Act to include other agricultural 
products. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at 4–10 (describing a variety of relief efforts). 
 254. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–78 (1936). 
 255. Pub. L. No. 74-461, 49 Stat. 1148, 1148–52 (1936). 
 256. See id. § 7(a) (establishing a policy to preserve and improve soil fertility, to promote 
the economic use and conservation of land, to reduce the waste of national soil resources, and to 
protect rivers and harbors from soil erosion in order to protect navigability and to prevent 
floods); id. §§ 8(b)–(c), 15 (authorizing up to $500 million a year for aid to farmers engaged in 
approved soil conservation and restoration, erosion control, and similar practices). 
 257. See id. § 7(b)–(g) (establishing a system of cooperative federalism in which the 
Secretary of Agriculture would approve and issue grants to eligible state programs to administer 
the program). 
 258. See id. § 7(a) (referring to a goal of “maintenance of a continuous and stable supply of 
agricultural commodities adequate to meet consumer demand at prices fair to both producers 
and consumers”). 
 259. Id. § 12.  
 260. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at 11. 
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Adjustment Act of 1938.261 The 1938 Act blended the loan-based parity 
concept of the 1933 Act with the direct grant approach in the 1936 
Act262 and added what would become a longstanding program of federal 
crop insurance.263 The new law employed marketing quotas and 
commodity reserve storage to help achieve supply and parity price 
goals.264 Along with the Agricultural Act of 1949,265 the 1938 Act 
remains the “default” policy absent periodic agricultural legislation 
(“farm bills”) that override those provisions during specific periods.266 
Several aspects of these new laws affect the balance between drought 
relief and risk reduction. 
The 1938 Act provided that soil conservation grants in “arid or 
semiarid” regions (a term not defined in the statute) may include “water 
conservation and the beneficial use of water on individual 
farms . . . .”267 Although designed to promote efficient water use, these 
grants facilitated investment in water storage and irrigation to develop 
agriculture in regions that otherwise could not support it. Although 
consistent with the Reclamation Act philosophy, this sent mixed signals 
about the risks of operating in arid regions. Congress also directed the 
Secretary of Agriculture to apportion funds based on acreage planted 
over the preceding decade, adjusted for “abnormal weather conditions 
and trends in acreage during the applicable period.”268 This method of 
apportionment provided incentives to plant during unfavorable weather. 
Payments were allotted based on the history of acreage seeded rather 
than crop yield, making productivity less relevant than total acreage for 
purposes of grant payments, and hence decisions about planting risk in 
dry years. Similarly, because base production was adjusted to account 
for abnormal weather, farmers could continue to plant in dry years 
without fear of reduced future payments.269 
                                                                                                                     
 261. Pub. L. No. 75-430, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).  
 262. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at 12–15 (discussing the Act and its effects). 
 263. Pub. L. No. 75-430, §§ 501–18, 52 Stat. 31 (1938). 
 264. Id. §§ 311–56. 
 265. Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051 (1949). 
 266. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 577–79 (describing the 1938 Act and the 1949 Act as the 
two key “[p]ermanent [p]rovisions” of U.S. agricultural law). 
 267. Pub. L. No. 75-430, § 101, 52 Stat. 31 (1938) (amending Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act § 8(b)). 
 268. Id. (amending Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act § 8(c)(1)). 
Apportionment was based on the “acreage seeded for the production of the commodity during 
the ten calendar years immediately preceding the calendar year in which the national acreage 
allotment is determined . . . .” Id. 
 269. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 amended the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act to account for abnormal weather as follows:  
If, on account of drought, flood, insect pests, plant disease, or other 
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The 1938 Act continued the parity philosophy of the 1933 Act, but 
through loans and direct parity payments.270 The new Commodity 
Credit Corporation administered the loans that, like those adopted 
during the Hoover Administration, were secured entirely by the 
crops.271 Those became known as “non-recourse loans” because the 
government had no recourse on default other than selling the crops 
pledged as collateral. Non-recourse loans allowed producers to sell their 
crops, repay their loans, and retain the difference as profit; or if market 
prices were low, to repay the loan with the crops pledged as collateral. 
Adding to that risk subsidy, the Secretary of Agriculture compensated 
producers for the difference between actual receipts and expected parity 
prices.272 Because parity payments were “in addition to and not in 
substitution for any other payments authorized by law,”273 a producer 
could receive, for the same crop, direct conservation grants, loans 
subsidized only by the crops produced, and parity payments. In the 
aggregate, these programs significantly lowered the risk to farmers of 
planting during droughts. 
The Act also established an elaborate system of marketing quotas for 
the five major commodity crops (tobacco, corn, wheat, cotton, and 
rice).274 To prevent the indiscriminate dumping of commodities on the 
market, which depressed prices and the agricultural economy generally, 
Congress directed the Secretary to set quotas when supplies exceeded 
prescribed amounts deemed “abnormally excessive.”275 Congress 
explained that government quotas were necessary given production 
volatility due to “natural causes” (including drought) and the inability of 
large numbers of diversely located farmers to organize sufficiently in 
order to limit production.276 In calculating quotas, however, drought and 
other natural causes were taken into account in two converse ways. 
First, “normal yield” was adjusted to account for “abnormal weather 
                                                                                                                     
uncontrollable natural cause, the yield in any year of such ten-year period is 
less than 75 per centum of the average (computed without regard to such year), 
such year shall be eliminated in calculating the normal yield per acre. 
Id. (amending Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act § 8(c)(5)). 
 270. Id. §§ 302–03. 
 271. See id. § 302(h) (eliminating personal liability of producers beyond the sale of the 
collateral absent fraudulent representations by the producer in obtaining a loan). Loans varied 
depending on crops and price conditions relative to parity prices. See id. § 302(b)–(d). Over 
time, Congress would amend parity levels repeatedly, often on a highly crop-specific basis, 
depending on both economic conditions and shifting political factors. See HISTORY OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 16–40.  
 272. Pub. L. No. 75-430, § 302, 52 Stat. 31 (1938).  
 273. Id. § 303. 
 274. Id. §§ 311–56. 
 275. See id. 
 276. See id. §§ 311, 321, 331, 341, 351. 
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conditions,” and years in which yields were reduced significantly were 
deleted.277 Second, in calculating “[r]eserve supply level[s],” increments 
were added to guard against shortages caused by droughts, floods, or 
other conditions.278 Thus, although Congress authorized quotas to 
prevent a “tragedy of the commons” phenomenon in which individual 
farmers increased production at the expense of market balance, the 
effect was to reduce the degree to which farmers considered the risk of 
drought. 
Finally, Congress established a new program of agricultural 
insurance, through which the government assumed risks that the private 
insurance market deemed imprudent.279 The program was administered 
by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC),280 and it authorized 
the FCIC to insure wheat producers281 “against loss in yields of wheat 
due to unavoidable causes, including drought . . . [and other] 
unavoidable causes . . . .”282 Because of federal capitalization and the 
lack of private shareholders, federal crop insurance conferred subsidies, 
as compared to the private market, if private crop insurance was 
available at all. Moreover, because the law did not define “drought,” 
payments were not limited to extreme conditions, leaving the magnitude 
of the subsidy to FCIC discretion. However, the program required 
farmers to base planting decisions on drought risk in some respects. The 
Act prohibited coverage of “losses due to the neglect or malfeasance of 
the producer or to the failure of the producer to reseed in areas and 
under circumstances where it is customary to reseed.”283 Insurance was 
limited to between 50% and 75% of the average yield of wheat on the 
farm for a representative base period, leaving between a quarter and half 
of the crop either uninsured or to the private insurance market.284 
Finally, the statute required premiums to be “fair and just”285 and 
mandated that the corporation’s capital stock could only be restored 
“out of operating profits of the Corporation.”286 Presumably, then, 
premiums had to suffice to meet expected payout obligations. 
Compassion was one justification for New Deal intervention into 
U.S. agricultural markets. Congress reallocated risk to society at large 
                                                                                                                     
 277. See id. § 301(b)(13). 
 278. See id. § 301(b)(14). 
 279. See id. § 508. 
 280. See id. § 503. 
 281. Congress initially limited federal crop insurance to wheat because of widespread 
failures of that crop during the droughts of the 1930s, see id. § 502, but later added other 
commodities. 
 282. Id. § 508(a). 
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. 
285.   Id. § 508(b). 
 286. Id. § 504(a).  
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from those whose livelihoods were disrupted by factors perceived to be 
beyond their control (such as drought). That rationale, of course, was 
the premise for broader social support mechanisms adopted in the 
United States during the 1930s.287 
Several related economic rationales, however, also justified drought 
relief and other New Deal agricultural policies. When large numbers of 
farms or other businesses fail or decline in profitability due to drought 
or other unpredictable causes, secondary economic impacts to 
surrounding communities can be significant.288 Drought relief 
rehabilitated regional economies, not only individual farmers. 
Moreover, to the extent that farmers produce basic life-support 
products, they assume the risk of drought on behalf of society. Although 
all businesses incur risks, society arguably has a greater interest in 
ensuring the continued supply of food and other life-support products. 
Moreover, businesses that face climate uncertainties incur significant 
risk beyond what is typical for many other businesses. A laissez-faire 
approach requires farmers to internalize that risk just like any other 
business. But weather and climate risk may be less amenable to 
prediction than other forms of business risk, and that uncertainty will 
only increase due to climate disruption. In addition, the federal 
government intervened in agricultural markets because producers were 
not responding effectively to imbalances between supply and demand. 
Even in the face of declining demand and prices, individual farmers 
maintained or expanded production to augment earnings and to meet 
debt obligations.289 Overproduction not only exacerbated the economic 
crisis by flooding the market when prices were already low, but it also 
damaged soil, water, and other resources, thus increasing vulnerability 
to drought. 
Viewed solely from the perspective of drought policy, the New Deal 
programs sent mixed messages to farmers. By abandoning the laissez-
faire approach, the new policies injected significant distortion into the 
agricultural economy in ways that reduced incentives to avoid farming 
in drought-prone regions, or to do so in sustainable ways,290 thus 
                                                                                                                     
 287. See BRANDS, supra note 233, at 297–98 (discussing federal measures during the 
opening days of Roosevelt Administration to alleviate the human consequences of bank failures, 
as an alternative to free market approach); Opie, supra note 11, at 250 (discussing the New 
Deal’s efforts to quell the economic damage suffered by the farmers of the 1930s). 
 288. During the Dust Bowl, drought impacts extended far beyond the boundaries of the 
farm to the entire banking, real estate, and financial infrastructure of affected regions. See supra 
Subsection I.C.1. 
 289. See JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 167, 179, 181 (observing that farmers planted in the 
hope of better conditions). 
 290. Such practices might include planting drought-resistant crops or crop varieties, 
cultivating only in productive soils, using water-efficient tilling and irrigation methods, 
53
Adler: Balancing Compassion And Risk In Climate Adaptation: U.S. Water,
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
254 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
increasing long-term drought vulnerability. To the extent that New Deal 
policies relied on loans that required repayment in cash or commodities, 
crop insurance that required payment of premiums, and conservation 
payments tied to planting allotments and quotas, the programs required 
farmers to internalize some of the risk of drought. On the other hand, 
producers’ risk decisions were distorted by guarantees such as direct 
parity payments, subsidies through below-market crop insurance rates, 
loan liability limited to the value of the crops as collateral, and the 
adjustment of production levels to account for drought and other losses. 
Two factors might have caused Congress to abandon price supports 
and production controls as the Great Depression ended. Demand for 
agricultural commodities skyrocketed during World War II due to 
production declines in the war zones, and the 1930s droughts gave way 
to favorable weather during the 1940s.291 However, to encourage high 
wartime production and ensure that farmers shared in profits generated 
by the war, Congress actually increased loan rates and price supports 
during the war, as well as the number of commodities covered.292 
Although wartime programs did not alter U.S. drought and agricultural 
policy, they hinted that temporary programs adopted to address the 
drought and depression would give way to the permanent decoupling of 
U.S. agriculture from free market forces. 
c.  Postwar Drought and Agricultural Policy 
U.S. drought and agricultural policies during the Cold War 
continued to send mixed signals about the degree to which farmers 
should internalize drought risk into production decisions. Despite the 
end of the market crisis and volatility generated by the Great Depression 
(crop surpluses) and World War II (crop shortages), Congress did not 
withdraw from wide-scale federal intervention into agricultural markets. 
However, with respect to drought relief specifically, the postwar period 
reflected a tension between the return to the free market approach 
during the Eisenhower Administration and the growing interest in 
public disaster preparedness as an overall Cold War strategy. 
Beginning in the 1950s, many aspects of federal drought policy were 
tied to legislation governing other disaster relief.293 This trend began in 
1950 with Public Law 81-875,294 which created the familiar process 
                                                                                                                     
fallowing acreage during the worst droughts, and diversifying the farm economy rather than 
relying exclusively on monocultures of commodity crops. 
 291. See Opie, supra note 11, at 251; JOHNSON, supra note 11, at 267–76. 
 292. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at 16–17. 
 293. See DYSON, supra note 233, at 3. 
 294. Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109 (1950). Dyson asserts that Congress passed this 
law, in part, in response to the Cold War threat of nuclear attack. DYSON, supra note 233, at 3. 
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under which state governors may request, and presidents may declare, 
disasters295 “of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster 
assistance by the Federal Government to supplement” state and local 
efforts and resources.296 Because the law provided no additional 
guidance on the nature, severity, geographic extent, or duration of 
disasters sufficient to warrant an emergency declaration, the law 
conferred tremendous discretion on the President to decide “how bad is 
bad enough” to justify federal disaster assistance.297 
Public Law 81-875 did not provide financial payments or other 
monetary relief, but authorized the federal government to provide 
equipment, supplies, personnel, distribution of food and medicine; and 
to protect lives and property, make emergency repairs, and temporarily 
replace public facilities.298 However, in later disaster relief statutes, 
Congress authorized loans and other financial relief for areas in which 
the President issued a disaster declaration.299 Although these measures 
constituted a subsidy to the extent that they provided credit not available 
on the private market,300 they did so only through loans rather than 
outright grants or relief payments, and with a provision specifically 
designed to limit assistance to operations that remained viable. This 
pattern continued in subsequent targeted drought and disaster relief bills 
through the 1970s,301 including the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (the 
                                                                                                                     
However, the legislative history indicates that the law was designed to provide a framework for 
federal assistance during “a major peacetime disaster.” See S. REP. NO. 2571 (1950), reprinted 
in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4023, 4024. 
 295. The statute’s definition of “major disaster” includes drought as well as other weather-
related disasters. See Pub L. No. 81-875, § 2(a), 64 Stat. 1109, 1109–10. 
 296. Id.  
 297. Id. § 5. 
 298. Id. § 3. 
 299. E.g., Pub. L. No. 83-115, 67 Stat. 149, 149–50 (1953) (authorizing “loans to 
established farmers and stockmen”). In response to protracted drought in the south-central 
states, Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to make temporary loans to farmers and 
stockmen in areas covered by presidential declarations of disasters, and for which commercial 
credit was not available. See H.R. REP. NO. 714 (1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1867, 
1868–69. Congress limited loans, however, to operators who had “a reasonable chance of 
working out of their difficulties with supplementary financing,” and for feed and seed in 
connection with any disaster determination. Id. at 1867–68. 
 300. See H.R. REP. NO. 714, at 1870–71 (citing concerns when cattle price declines 
increase risk of loan defaults). 
 301. See, e.g., Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-769, § 3, 80 Stat. 1316, 1316 
(1966) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to adjust federal loans in areas affected by disaster 
declarations under Public Law 81-875); Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 
§§ 231–32, 84 Stat. 1744, 1752–53 (1970) (authorizing disaster loans to small business and 
farmers and the cancelation or modification of loans); Emergency Livestock Credit Act of 1974, 
Pub. L. No. 93-357, §§ 2(a), 3(a)–(c), 88 Stat. 391, 391–92 (1974) (authorizing federal loan 
guarantees to “bona fide farmers and ranchers who are primarily and directly engaged in 
agricultural production” to support livestock operations where commercial credit is not 
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Stafford Act),302 which comprehensively revised and broadened the 
scope of federal relief for all kinds of disasters, including drought.303 
Furthermore, the Act retained but modified the basic format of 
gubernatorial request and presidential declaration of disaster 
emergencies and major disasters.304 
Similarly, federal agricultural policy continued to provide both 
incentives and disincentives to reducing drought vulnerability. 
Immediately after World War II, ongoing federal intervention into the 
agricultural economy was hardly a foregone conclusion. Just as 
Congress intended that the New Deal agricultural program would expire 
when the economic emergency subsided, it provided that wartime 
agricultural subsidy programs would terminate two years after the end 
of hostilities.305 When the time of reckoning arrived, however, Congress 
determined that the absence of the wartime stimulus not only supported 
continuation of the program, but did so with even higher levels of 
subsidies.306 With the Agricultural Act of 1949,307 Congress reaffirmed 
the dual goals of production controls and parity prices. Despite ongoing 
structural changes in U.S. agriculture from a large number of small 
farms to an increasing concentration of farms and products,308 the 
postwar decision to continue price supports and production controls 
occurred without a fundamental reconsideration of whether the 
agricultural sector could now self-regulate production in response to 
prices better than it had during previous eras. 
If anything, federal agricultural programs expanded in the postwar 
era. The 1949 Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to continue 
agricultural price supports via loans, purchases, or other methods, with 
                                                                                                                     
available, where additional financing is “absolutely essential in order for the loan applicant to 
remain in business,” and where there is a “reasonable probability” of meeting the Act’s 
objectives and of loan repayment). 
 302. Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
 303. The definitions of both “emergency” and “major disaster” include drought. A “major 
disaster” declaration authorizes the President to provide assistance beyond emergency services. 
Id. § 102(1)–(2). 
 304. See id. § 301. 
 305. See S. REP. NO. 81-1130 (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2407, 2408. 
 306. “[I]t is imperative that the program be placed on a permanent, peacetime basis 
beginning in 1950 principally because the extraordinary demands for American agricultural 
production during the war period have largely ceased to exist.” Id. With respect to subsidy 
levels, the Report also noted “the range of support levels from 52 to 75 percent of parity for the 
basic commodities contained in that act is much too low for effective use now.” Id. 
 307. Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051 (1949). 
 308. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at 46; CAROLYN DIMITRI, ANNE EFFLAND, & NEILSON CONKLIN, U.S. DEPT. 
AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, ECON. INFO. BULL. NO. 3, THE 20TH CENTURY 
TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE AND FARM POLICY 2, 5 fig.3 (2005). 
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strong preferences to producers who cooperate with established, crop-
specific marketing quotas, but with even higher minimum and 
maximum levels of support relative to the parity price.309 Moreover, in 
addition to “basic agricultural commodities,”310 the 1949 Act added 
specified “nonbasic agricultural commodities” at different support 
levels.311 Otherwise, Congress largely reaffirmed the basic precepts of 
the existing statutes.312 
The Cold War also increased incentives to expand international 
markets in friendly nations at the expense of Communist countries. In 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,313 
Congress authorized the President to negotiate agreements with 
“friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations”314 to sell “surplus 
agricultural commodities [in return] for foreign currencies,”315 and to 
use those currencies to further develop agricultural markets, among 
other purposes.316 Although motivated mainly by foreign policy,317 this 
                                                                                                                     
 309. Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-439, § 101, 63 Stat. 1051, 1051 (1949). 
Within legislatively mandated ranges of price supports, the Secretary was given discretion to 
establish support levels based on a series of factors, including: (1) the relationship between 
supply and demand; (2) price supports for other commodities; (3) funding levels; (4) the 
perishable nature of each commodity; (5) the importance of each commodity to agriculture and 
the national economy; (6) marketability of stocks collected by the government; (7) needs to 
offset export losses; and (8) producer willingness to control supplies relative to demand. Id. 
§ 401(b). 
 310. These now included corn, cotton, peanuts, rice, tobacco, and wheat. See id. § 408(c) 
(adding peanuts to the five commodities included in the 1938 Act). 
 311. These included wool, tung nuts, honey, Irish potatoes, milk, butterfat, and milk and 
butterfat products, at different specified prices. See id. §§ 201, 301–02. 
 312. See, e.g., id. § 401(c) (authorizing Secretary to condition assistance on compliance 
with production goals and marketing quotas); id. § 402 (authorizing increased support when 
necessary to assure adequate supplies for purposes of national welfare or national security); id. 
§ 405 (limiting producer liability to the value of the crops used as collateral to secure loans); id. 
§ 408(h) (allowing Secretary to modify the calculation of “normal supply” due to “abnormal 
conditions”). High, fixed-price supports continued during the Korean War, again to stimulate 
wartime production. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE-SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT 
PROGRAMS, supra note 237, at 20–21. 
 313. Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (1954). 
 314. The Act defined “friendly nation” to mean “any country other than (1) the U.S.S.R., or 
(2) any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign 
organization controlling the world Communist movement.” Id. § 107. 
 315. Id. §§ 101–02. 
 316. Id. § 104.  
 317. See id. § 201 (authorizing the President to use surplus agricultural commodities to 
meet “famine or other urgent relief requirements” to “friendly peoples” or to “friendly but needy 
populations without regard to the friendliness of their government”); id. § 304 (directing the 
President “(1) to assist friendly nations to be independent of trade with the U.S.S.R. or nations 
dominated or controlled by the U.S.S.R. for food, raw materials and markets, and (2) to assure 
that agricultural commodities sold or transferred [under the Act] do not result in increased 
availability of those or like commodities to unfriendly nations”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1776 
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strategy continued to shift the focus from curtailing agricultural 
production to encouraging domestic surpluses for international trade.318 
Nevertheless, Congress continued price supports and production 
controls for commodity crops, but with fine-tuning through periodic 
“farm bills,” typically in five-year intervals, which reauthorized but 
modified the commodity-specific “permanent provisions” of earlier 
law.319 Congress continued to assert that federal price supports and 
production controls were essential to the national economy and that 
without them, increased productivity per acre would outstrip demand, 
causing prices to plummet, agricultural markets to collapse, and farms 
to fail. 320 Therefore, farm legislation during this period tried to balance 
the goal of matching supply and demand to maintain stable prices with 
the goal of expanding export markets. In the 1970 farm bill, for 
example, Congress maintained but specified price supports and planting 
limitations established in earlier law321 and extended the export 
development policy.322 Federal crop subsidies continued to offset 
farming risk so long as producers planted the specified amount of 
acreage, which was fixed based on past planting patterns rather than 
current conditions.323 
Thus, despite the return to economic prosperity and more 
                                                                                                                     
(1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2509, 2509 (noting that the main purpose of legislation 
was “to authorize the President to use agricultural commodities to improve the foreign 
relations”). This was not the first time agricultural price supports were used in foreign policy. 
During World War II, price supports supported the war effort by providing food and fiber to the 
United States and its allies. See S. REP. NO. 1130, supra note 304, at 2407–08. 
 318. H.R. REP. NO. 1776, supra note 316, at 2510 (“Thus, our farm productive capacity 
now is running in excess of current market demands. A major factor has been the reduction in 
exports from the postwar peak . . . . Our goal in the trade section of this legislation is to reverse 
this trend of restricted exports by expanding world outlets.”). 
 319. See Agriculture Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, 84 Stat. 1358; Food and Agriculture 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321, 79 Stat. 1187; Agricultural Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-128, 
75 Stat. 294; Agricultural Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-540, 70 Stat. 188. 
 320. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 687 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3957, 3959–60 
(“Action . . . to extend and augment farm commodity programs is imperative. The entire 
economy as well as the farm segment will benefit from such action and would suffer for lack of 
it.”). 
 321. Agriculture Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-524, §§ 401–02, 84 Stat. 1358, 1362 
(amending the Agriculture Act of 1949 with respect to wheat); id. § 501 (same, with respect to 
feed grains); id. §§ 601–02 (same, with respect to cotton). 
 322. See id. § 701. 
 323. See, e.g., id. § 402 (amending section 379c of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 
1938 to exempt wheat allotment acreage not planted due to disasters or other conditions beyond 
producer control). The Secretary was again instructed to exclude from calculations of allotments 
acreage not planted due to drought and other “natural disaster” or “condition beyond the control 
of the producer,” see, e.g., id. (amending sections 379b and 379c of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938), further minimizing the relevance of such risk factors in producer planting 
decisions. The 1970 law, however, limited total crop subsidies under the Act to $55,000 per 
person. Id. § 101(1). 
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conservative leadership after World War II, Cold War disaster-planning 
mentality, foreign policy motivations, and farmers’ expectations of 
ongoing government support led Congress to perpetuate the price 
supports and production controls begun during the New Deal. These 
factors also led to a patchwork of federal disaster relief efforts relating 
to droughts. Drought relief continued to focus on loans, ensuring that 
producers continued to bear some risk of bad weather, and thus had 
some incentive to take drought risk into account in planting decisions. 
However, federal commodity programs likely overwhelmed incentives 
in loan-based disaster relief efforts in terms of their effect on producer 
planting decisions. Virtually guaranteed income, on top of additional 
subsidies provided by crop insurance and disaster loans, significantly 
reduced the need for farmers to incorporate the risk of loss into 
production decisions. Moreover, farm bill programs encouraged farmers 
to plant commodity crops at the expense of a more diverse and more 
drought-tolerant mix of crops. 
d.  The “Free Market” Evolution of U.S. Agricultural Law and Policy 
U.S. agricultural laws and policies morphed during the 1970s and 
1980s in ways that increased incentives for overproduction and 
unsustainable farming practices,324 including expanded production in 
regions that face increased water scarcity. Those policies, boosted by 
massive federal subsidies to flood the world market with cheap 
commodity crops, now encourage U.S. farmers to expand production of 
commodity crops, even during times of plummeting global commodity 
prices and significant resulting reductions in net farm income.325 In the 
long run, absent a shift to more sustainable practices, those incentives 
could render farmers in the Great Plains and other regions more 
vulnerable to drought, whether induced by climate disruption or 
otherwise, just as they were in the late 1920s and early 1930s.326 
                                                                                                                     
 324. See Jennifer Hoffpauir, The Environmental Impact of Commodity Subsidies: NEPA 
and the Farm Bill, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 233, 234, 244–56 (2009) (evaluating adverse 
environmental impacts of farm subsidies); Kwan, supra note 99, at 571–72 (referring to 1973 
changes as a “fundamental transition, shifting . . . from a loan-based system of controlling prices 
to a payment-based system emphasizing production”); Davidson, supra note 100 (discussing the 
detrimental farming policies creating during the 1980s); Angelo, supra note 100 (discussing 
current problematic agricultural practices, as well as the laws which seem to incentivize those 
practices). 
 325. See DENNIS KEENEY & LONI KEMP, A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE UNITED 
STATES 7–11 (2003); DARYLL E. RAY ET AL., RETHINKING U.S. AGRICULTURAL POLICY: 
CHANGING COURSE TO SECURE FARMER LIVELIHOODS WORLDWIDE 9–14 (2003); Eubanks, supra 
note 76, at 10,496–97. 
 326. Those policies simultaneously increase vulnerability of farmers in developing 
countries, who cannot compete with the flood of cheap commodities from the United States and 
Europe. See RAY ET AL., supra note 325, at 11, 13. 
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Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz promoted the first and most 
dramatic shift in U.S. agricultural law and policy during the early 
1970s. Butz advocated for consolidating small farms into larger 
agribusinesses and planting available farmland “from fencerow to 
fencerow” in order to lower food prices and to further expand U.S. 
export markets.327 Those arguments persuaded Congress to change the 
focus of U.S. farm policy in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection 
Act of 1973.328 Although the 1973 Act and later farm bills established a 
phenomenally complex, interwoven set of programs based on a 
combination of economic tools, it minimized the role of parity price 
supports329 in favor of a new program of target prices and deficiency 
payments. This new program was designed to ensure certain levels of 
revenue for major commodity producers, with guaranteed adjustments 
for drought and other disasters.330 From the 1930s through the 1960s, 
Congress approved significant federal subsidies,331 but nevertheless 
forced farmers to internalize at least some of the risks of planting 
decisions. The virtually guaranteed price subsidies in the 1973 Act 
further reduced incentives for planters to account for drought risk in 
deciding what to plant and when. Ironically, although the program was 
sold as a “free market” approach to agricultural policy because it 
allowed prices to fluctuate based on actual market supply and demand 
rather than government dictates,332 it functions as anything but a free 
market from the perspective of the government’s increased 
subsidization of U.S agriculture. 
Although others have traced the complicated history of subsequent 
farm bills,333 Congress has retained the direct payment approach to farm 
subsidies, combined with a new set of loan provisions that further 
reduce farmer planting risk regardless of weather or market 
conditions.334 For several farm bill cycles, Congress retained the dual 
system of loans plus deficiency payments, with crop-specific fine-
tuning based on market conditions and political pressures.335 In the 
                                                                                                                     
 327. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 580. 
 328. Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (1973); see id. § 815(d) (directing Secretary of 
Agriculture to encourage U.S. farmers to maximize production); HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL 
PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS,  supra note 237, at 29–31 (discussing the Act and 
its effects).  
 329. See § 101(1), 87 Stat. at 221 (lowering price support limit to $20,000). 
 330. See, e.g., id. § 206(8)(A) (amending Act to provide for wheat deficiency payments, 
with disaster adjustments). 
 331. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at iv–v (summarizing the major agricultural legislation). 
 332. Pub. L. No. 93-86, 87 Stat. 221 (1973). 
 333. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 623–29; Kwan, supra note 99, at 572, 580–87. 
 334. See Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 245. 
 335. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
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Food Security Act of 1985,336 Congress added “[m]arketing loans”337 
that allow farmers to store commodities when prices are low and to 
repay the loans when the market improves.338 In the Federal Agriculture 
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (FAIRA),339 Congress replaced 
target prices and deficiency payments with “production flexibility 
contracts” in which farmers received guaranteed direct payments tied to 
their contract acreage. Congress later augmented FAIRA with additional 
emergency payments when market conditions failed to improve.340 In 
the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002,341 Congress added 
“counter-cyclical” payments when commodity prices fell below 
statutory targets based on historical averages.342 
All of these changes since 1973 could reduce drought vulnerability 
in some ways while increasing it in others. Direct payments, marketing 
loans, and countercyclical payments offset the risk farmers take in 
meeting society’s need for food and fiber, thus meeting Congress’ long-
term goal of stabilizing farm income while ensuring a sufficient and 
reasonably priced food supply. Moreover, by basing direct payments on 
historical acreage rather than actual production, Congress gave farmers 
the flexibility to fallow lands under poor conditions and to still receive 
some income for that acreage.343 On the other hand, those guarantees 
have encouraged overproduction of statutory commodity crops.344 
Among other social, economic, and environmental problems caused by 
those incentives,345 agricultural subsidies promote crop selection based 
on subsidies rather than climatic or other environmental factors, and 
planting decisions based on guaranteed payments rather than water 
supply and soil conditions. 
Federal production limits and land conservation programs begun in 
the 1938 Soil Conservation Act provide counterincentives, through 
voluntary programs to protect sensitive acreage and curtail production. 
Those included the “Soil Bank” program established temporarily in 
                                                                                                                     
note 237, at 32, 37 (describing both the Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 and the Agriculture 
and Food Act of 1981). 
 336. Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). 
 337. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 582 (“Marketing loans first came into effect with the 
Food Secuirty Act of 1985.”). 
 338. See id. §§ 308, 501, 601 (detailing this process for wheat, cotton, and rice, 
respectively); Kwan, supra note 99, at 582. Congress continued that program in the 1996 law. 
See id. 
 339. Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996). 
 340. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 581–82. 
 341. Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002). 
 342. See Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 238–39; Kwan, supra note 99, at 583–84. 
 343. See Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 238. 
 344. See Kwan, supra note 99, at 585. 
 345. See id. at 586 & n.112; Angelo, supra note 100, at 602–13. 
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1956346 and a wide range of more recent programs347 for which 
Congress has increased funding in recent decades.348 Those programs 
could serve as tools for federal drought prevention policy by 
conditioning subsidies on sustainable water use. However, agricultural 
conservation provisions have received mixed reviews in terms of their 
effectiveness in protecting the environment.349 Ultimately, the question 
is whether incentives to reduce drought vulnerability through 
conservation programs can override stronger incentives to continue 
excess production of commodity crops, given the vastly higher funding 
levels Congress has devoted to those programs350 and ongoing efforts to 
expand U.S. agricultural export markets. Moreover, none of the existing 
conservation programs focus primarily on water use. 
e.  Ongoing Problems in Federal Agricultural and Drought Policy 
From the perspective of reducing drought vulnerability, not much 
has changed in federal agricultural or drought law and policy since the 
1970s. Congress largely continued the “free market” policies begun in 
1973 in the most recent farm bill, the Food, Conservation, and Energy 
Act of 2008.351 New incentives to grow corn for biofuels reinforce those 
free market policies.352 
To the extent that Congress has adopted drought-specific legislation, 
it has fallen prey to the “hydro-illogical cycle”353 and has tended to do 
so on an ad hoc basis in response to individual droughts, with the 
response proportional to the pressure from constituents for relief.354 
                                                                                                                     
 346. See HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL PRICE SUPPORT AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS, supra 
note 237, at 22.  
 347. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 629–32 (discussing various modern programs, 
including the 2008 Farm Bill, the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, and the 
Agricultural Management Assistance Program). 
 348. See id.; Davidson, supra note 100, at 5, 36 (noting increased funding for conservation 
programs in 2002 farm bill). 
 349. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 632 (arguing that agricultural conservation programs 
fail to “address the overarching environmental concerns associated with industrial commodity 
production”); Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 245–46 (explaining problems with Conservation 
Reserve Program and reporting significant declines in enrolled CRP acreage between 2007 and 
2010, and significant conversion of grassland to cropland). 
 350. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 100, at 37 (estimating in 2003 that only 18% of farm 
bill payments support conservation); Hoffpauir, supra note 324, at 236, 246 (reporting that, out 
of $92.9 billion in farm support under the 2002 Farm Bill, the vast majority ($72.9 billion) was 
for commodity support programs (citing RALPH M. CHITE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: FARM 
BILL BUDGET AND COSTS: 2002 VS. 2007, at 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/10207/bitstreams/18788.pdf)). 
 351. Pub. L. No. 110-246, 122 Stat. 1651 (2008); see also Angelo, supra note 100, at 625. 
 352. See Angelo, supra note 100, at 633–37. 
 353. DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 54. 
 354. See NATIONAL STUDY OF WATER MANAGEMENT DURING DROUGHT, supra note 27, at 
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Drought management experts and government agencies and 
commissions have continued to criticize this practice as producing relief 
measures that are ineffective, poorly coordinated, and short-term and 
reactive in focus.355 An ad hoc, emergency-oriented legislative practice 
also distorts whatever risk allocation principles and incentives for 
sustainability may be included in state or federal water law. When 
legislatures pass drought relief solely in response to individual crises, it 
is too late to adopt policies to require or encourage water users to 
engage in sound risk management and more sustainable practices. 
Especially given political pressure to help desperate constituents, 
emergency legislation inevitably focuses almost entirely on providing 
compassionate physical and financial relief. 
Comprehensive federal drought legislation was proposed in 
Congress in 2003356 in response to findings of the National Drought 
Policy Commission,357 but has not been enacted to date. Congress has, 
however, adopted discrete provisions that move in the direction of a 
more coherent federal drought policy.358 Legislation adopted 
independently of any particular drought could focus on risk reduction 
by promoting sustainable water use and management in advance of a 
crisis, in addition to addressing drought planning, forecasting, 
communication, and coordination. Such proactive legislation could also 
expressly condition drought relief on the adoption of responsible risk-
reduction measures. An anticipatory approach is more objective because 
it separates long-term policy decisions from impacts to particular 
constituents. Of course, the necessary corollary would be subsequent 
legislative discipline—that is, Congress would need to avoid the 
inclination to bail out those who fail to respond to the incentives in the 
omnibus legislation. 
 
                                                                                                                     
26 tbl.III (identifying major federal and state legislation passed during the late 1980s drought). 
See generally DYSON, supra note 230 (providing history of federal drought relief legislation).  
 355. See, e.g., PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23; FEDERAL 
EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT, supra note 82. 
 356. S. 1454, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 357. PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note 23, at 35. 
 358. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 313d (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to 
establish a National Integrated Drought Information System to collect and synthesize data to 
provide and communicate early drought warnings); 33 U.S.C. § 2267a (2006) (authorizing 
Secretary of the Army to assess drought and other water resource needs, and to prioritize federal 
projects, on a river basin or watershed basis); 42 U.S.C. § 5131 (2006) (authorizing the 
President to create a federal disaster preparedness plan, and to assist states, through grants and 
otherwise, in developing and implementing state disaster preparation plans); 42 U.S.C. § 10367 
(2006) (establishing National Streamflow Information Program within U.S. Geological Survey, 
including goal of better understanding hydrologic extremes like droughts); 43 U.S.C. §§ 2215, 
2222–23 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to work with state, federal, and local 
officials to create drought contingency plans in Reclamation Act states). 
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The ability of federal drought relief programs to reduce vulnerability 
has also been plagued by the same absence of consistent definitions 
characteristic of other areas of water and drought law. In response to 
serious droughts during the mid-1970s, for example, a federal 
interagency committee designated counties eligible for federal relief 
absent any clear legal standard or guidance.359 Presumably in the face of 
political pressure, two-thirds of the Nation’s counties were designated 
drought disaster areas, making them eligible for federal relief.360 That 
unguided approach likely resulted in undeserving aid recipients and 
spread resources so thinly that others may not have received necessary 
aid. 
During the 1970s, federal agencies also applied differing drought 
definitions to identify eligible aid recipients.361 Although varying 
criteria may be appropriate for different relief, critics suggested that 
those differences were more ad hoc than well-considered.362 Federal 
agencies continue to use different criteria for determining eligibility for 
drought relief or assistance.363 On the other hand, there has been a move 
to systematize and coordinate dissemination of drought information 
through projects such as the U.S. Drought Monitor,364 the North 
American Drought Monitor,365 and the Seasonal Drought Outlook.366 
Although these efforts do not provide legally binding drought 
definitions, they help create common standards and nomenclature for 
understanding and communicating drought information. 
                                                                                                                     
 359. See MANAGING RESOURCE SCARCITY, supra note 122, at 20–22. 
 360. See id.; FEDERAL EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND COORDINATE RESPONSES TO DROUGHT, 
supra note 82, at 2; COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 1976–77 
DROUGHT: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE NEXT? 2 (1979) [hereinafter FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 
1976–77 DROUGHT]. 
 361. See FEDERAL RESPONSE TO THE 1976–77 DROUGHT, supra note 360, at 17. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1531(d)(1)(B) (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to 
establish drought monitor to classify drought severity); 19 U.S.C. § 2497(d)(1)(B) (2006) 
(establishing drought monitor system to classify drought severity for customs purposes); 43 
U.S.C. § 2214 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to determine eligibility for 
drought assistance from Bureau of Reclamation under § 2213). 
 364. See U.S. DROUGHT MONITOR, http://drought.unl.edu/dm (last visited Oct. 3, 2011). 
This tool is designed to provide a comprehensive assessment of drought conditions across the 
country at particular points in time. See MICHAEL J. HAYES ET AL., Drought Monitoring: New 
Tools for the 21st Century, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, at 53, 54, 58. 
 365. See N. Am. Drought Monitor, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., North American 
Drought Monitor Overview, NOAA, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/monitoring/ 
drought/nadm/ (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (describing the Monitor’s success rate at “assessing 
and communicating the state of drought in the US [sic] on a weekly basis”). 
 366. See Nat’l Weather Serv. Climate Prediction Ctr., U.S. Seasonal Drought Outlook, 
NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, http://www.cpc.ncep.noaa.gov/products/expert_assessment/ 
seasonal_drought.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2011) (providing seasonal drought assessments). 
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CONCLUSION: BALANCING COMPASSION AND RISK IN A DISRUPTED 
CLIMATE 
In a disrupted climate, agriculture and certain other economic sectors 
will be forced to undertake increased risks caused by other economic 
activities. Although agriculture contributes to climate disruption,367 it is 
arguably inequitable to require one economic sector to internalize a 
disproportionate share of external costs of global problems generated by 
many others. This inequity is particularly true for an economic sector 
like agriculture, which provides many of society’s basic necessities. 
Whether induced by compassion, politics, or other factors, efforts are 
(and will be) made to compensate those who bear an unfair burden on 
behalf of society at large. However, measures to spread the risk of 
climate disruption could have the negative effect of increasing 
vulnerability by subsidizing activities that will eventually increase 
drought and other risks. In this regard, drought and other disaster 
response policies that might be appropriate for occasional and difficult-
to-foresee events may no longer be appropriate for conditions that will 
now occur with increasing frequency due to climate disruption.  
 One role of law is to allocate risk fairly and in a way that achieves 
sound public policy goals. A second role of law is to promote or require 
behavioral changes deemed beneficial to the community. These 
functions of law suggest that climate adaptation strategies should reflect 
a considered judgment about the appropriate balance between 
compensating victims of climate disruption and reducing long-term 
vulnerability. In the case of climate-induced changes in drought 
frequency, severity, and geographic scope, identifying this balance will 
require a serious rethinking of drought law and policy and of more 
fundamental aspects of water and agricultural law and policy, as well. 
In establishing programs to provide drought relief, the definition of 
drought should be based on consistent policy decisions about how the 
risk of water shortages should be distributed. Declaring drought (and 
providing relief) too readily can discourage prevention and risk 
reduction, while declaring drought too late can result in significant 
hardship and secondary impacts. Thus, any comprehensive federal 
drought legislation should identify consistent principles governing when 
federal drought relief or other responses should be triggered.368 
Moreover, drought relief can be effectively balanced against risk 
reduction goals by providing relief only to those who take appropriate 
                                                                                                                     
 367. See KEITH PAUSTIAN ET AL., AGRICULTURE’S ROLE IN GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION 
passim (2006); Angelo, supra note 100, at 612–13. 
 368. Given the complexity of drought monitoring and definitions, it is probably necessary 
to delegate the task of adopting specific numeric drought criteria to administrative agencies. 
Moreover, regional variation may be necessary to reflect the diversity of climatic, hydrological, 
and other conditions in the United States. 
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measures to reduce vulnerability, such as switching to low water 
demand crops in drought-prone regions or improving irrigation or other 
water-use efficiency. 
However, those improvements alone, although extremely important, 
may be too narrow to address the increasing frequency and severity of 
drought that may accompany climate disruption. Underlying patterns of 
human land and water use will increase water demand and thus 
exacerbate the effects of reduced water supply.369 The impact of use 
patterns on water supply suggests a need for broader changes in the 
laws and policies affecting the places, purposes, and efficiencies of 
water use. Although water law has long been criticized for protecting 
existing uses at the expense of efficiency and shifting societal needs and 
preferences,370 changes that increase incentives to use water more 
sustainably and to eliminate impediments to water transfers will become 
even more important. Moreover, it may be preferable to adopt drought-
neutral approaches to water law, or to condition any changes to water 
rights during drought on prior efforts to reduce drought vulnerability. 
Providing relief from the regular requirements of water law in the case 
of drought may protect existing uses in times of shortage, but it does so 
at the expense of long-term vulnerability. 
Finally, although agriculture is just one of the many economic 
sectors in which water use efficiency is important to drought 
vulnerability and severity, it is the area of federal law that has 
historically been most closely associated with federal drought policy 
and response. In many parts of the United States, agriculture is the 
largest consumptive water user, and yet it is also the user most likely to 
be adversely affected by drought. Therefore, broader changes in 
agricultural law and policy are necessary to reduce drought vulnerability 
in the face of climate disruption. Rather than continuing to promote 
excess production of a predetermined set of commodity crops 
irrespective of climatic and other conditions, federal agricultural law 
should promote production of the most appropriate crops based on 
water supply, temperature, and other conditions in particular regions in 
the face of climate disruption. If federal agricultural law and policy, 
along with its massive historic subsidies, continues to serve as the 
primary factor motivating economic decisions about what crops to plant 
and where, changes to water and drought law and policy will play, at 
best, only a limited role in reducing drought vulnerability. 
                                                                                                                     
 369. See Donald A. Wilhite & Margie Buchanan-Smith, Drought as Hazard: 
Understanding the Natural and Social Context, in DROUGHT AND WATER CRISIS, supra note 23, 
at 10 (discussing “human-induced drought” where demand exceeds supply even during times of 
normal precipitation); COPING WITH WATER SCARCITY, supra note 7, at 8–10 (distinguishing 
between natural conditions leading to drought and human-induced water shortages). 
 370. See Wilkinson, supra note 95. 
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U.S. water, drought, and agricultural law provide just one example 
of the need to balance compassion and risk in climate adaptation 
policies. The same basic lesson may be appropriate to economic sectors 
affected by other impacts of climate disruption. Examples include real 
estate developers facing risks from sea level rise and electric power 
suppliers facing higher demand as temperatures rise. The compassionate 
or political impulse may be to provide subsidies or other financial relief 
from those impacts. But in addition to becoming increasingly and 
perhaps impossibly expensive, those responses may only perpetuate the 
very activities that increase long-term vulnerability to climate change. 
Rather than adopting climate adaptation policies through after-the-fact, 
band-aid solutions, the most effective responses should consider the 
basic economic drivers of activities that increase vulnerability to climate 
disruption. 
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